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ABSTRACT 
Glory-seeking: A Timeless & Puzzling Craving of the Human Soul 
Written by: Eric Marturano 
Advised by: Professor Christopher Constas 
Philosophers throughout the ages have grappled with the concept of glory-seeking 
and have offered many different references, analyses, insights, and explanations. Three 
great thinkers in particular stand out above the rest: Plato, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Paul 
Sartre. While these three minds span from circa 420 BC all the way up to 1980 AD, they 
all would agree that glory-seeking certainly matters – they would most likely argue over 
the following: In what way? 
 For Plato, glory-seeking is an inherent part of the human soul. It matters because 
it is an essential part of our being. Plato’s model for the soul found in The Republic as 
well as a comparable illustration in the Phaedrus expresses this claim most thoroughly. 
Additional support for the idea of glory-seeking being an existing precondition of 
humanity can be found in other ancient works as well, most notably Homer’s Iliad. A 
current example is professional athletes in the NFL risking their earning potential in order 
to play injured.  
 For Hobbes, glory-seeking is a tool to be used for social advantage. It matters 
because it can be used it for advantage and power. Chapters X and XIII in The Leviathan 
most critically highlight this sentiment. Further support for the idea of glory-seeking 
being a weapon in the self-made man’s arsenal can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. The largest modern-day example is celebrity 
culture: the news and entertainment factory so woven into current American culture, 
which is particularly embodied by the public behavior and lyrics of hip-hop artist Kanye 
West. 
 For Sartre, glory-seeking provides an answer to existential angst. It matters 
because it helps us believe that we matter. The Sartre’s philosophical work, Being and 
Nothingness, as well as his existential novel, Nausea, provide ample evidence of this 
notion. More support for the idea of glory-seeking as a method of coping with the 
awareness one’s own existence can be found in Søren Kierkegaard’s The Present Age. 
Contemporary manifestations include the incessant self-promotion and self-presentation 
found on social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. 
 The goal of this work is to first investigate glory-seeking for Plato, Hobbes, and 
Sartre and analyze what each thinker has to say on the matter. After that, modern 
examples and additional input from other relevant philosophers will be assessed within 
the overall context of glory-seeking for Plato, Hobbes, and Sartre. Finally, after 
everything has been considered, I will attempt to synthesize all that has been presented 
thus far while answering the question: Why does glory-seeking matter? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
What is Thumos & Why Does Glory Matter? 
 
Not too long ago, I went out to a bar with some friends on a Thursday night. As a 
college senior who had recently turned twenty-one and grew up hearing various 
adults in my life reminisce about the glory of their “college years,” I was excited to 
finally have a few drinks with my fellow students in a public space and maybe even 
create a few memories of my own. Unlike those belonging to an older generation, 
however, memories from that night (and any other night out, for that matter) will exist 
not only as rosy, happy, fuzzy tales drawn from the cobwebs of my mind, but also 
(and eternally) as a series of crisply Instagrammed selfies, cleverly-quipped Tweets, 
and snobbishly touted Facebook check-ins occupying a personally public space on the 
worldwide web. Well, at least that’s how it will be on my friends’ timelines. I’ve 
never really been much for selfies. 
I find myself constantly asking why (perhaps as a result of studying philosophy?). 
Usually that “why” is something along the lines of “Why the hell would you take a 
selfie?” or “Why would a football player play injured and risk ruining his small 
window of time to earn money?” or “Why would anyone actually want be famous?” 
or “What exactly is a reputation?” or “Why do people get mad if you fudge their job 
title?” I’ve come to notice most of my wondering points back to a central question: 
Why does glory-seeking matter? 
One central element to glory-seeking is the concept of ‘thumos.’ It’s a pretty 
uncommon term – it’s Greek, actually –and according to its most famous user, Plato, 
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thumos means “the passionate or spirited element”1 of the human soul. According to 
Plato,2 the human soul is divided into three parts: the appetitive, the spirited (thumos), 
and the rational. It is the job of the rational portion to choose how to quench the 
material, tangible appetites as well as the immaterial, intangible passions. There is an 
obvious logic to the appetitive portion of the soul, of course. Humans have natural 
needs – such as those for food, shelter, clothing, and the means (money) to acquire 
these basic necessities – and thus a natural desire to satisfy them. 
However, the spirited portion of the soul – the one that is fueled by thumos and 
seeks glory – is more abstract and certainly more puzzling. There is little logic for its 
existence and, quite often, it is problematic either by itself or in conflict with the 
goals of the appetitive portion of the soul. After all, what self-protecting, rational-
minded being would dive on a grenade simply out of duty or the honor of being 
remembered as a hero by those whom he or she saved? Likewise, where is the 
personal and tangible value in becoming a religious or political martyr? Human 
beings have clearly been acting out of something other than appetite or reason since 
the beginning of time – but why? Does glory really matter this much to us? Is there 
any possible explanation for such spirit-driven behavior? 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Plato. The Republic, Cohen, S. Marc., Patricia Curd, and C. Reeve. "Republic." Readings in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy: from Thales to Aristotle. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 2005. Pg. 331-578. Print .Book 
IV (440a-440d). 
2 Ibid, Book IV, Passim 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Different Dealings of the Spirit: Plato, Hobbes, and Sartre Then & Now 
 Philosophers throughout the ages have grappled with glory-seeking and have 
offered many different references, analyses, insights, and explanations. Three great 
thinkers in particular stand out above the rest: Plato, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Paul 
Sartre. While these three minds span from circa 420 BC all the way up to 1980 AD, they 
all would agree that glory-seeking certainly matters but they would most likely argue 
over the following: In what way? 
 For Plato, glory-seeking is an inherent part of the human soul. It matters because 
it is an essential part of our being. Plato’s model for the soul, found in The Republic, as 
well as a comparable illustration in the Phaedrus, expresses this claim most thoroughly. 
Additional support for the idea of glory-seeking being an existing precondition of 
humanity can be found in other ancient works as well, most notably Homer’s Iliad. A 
current example is professional athletes in the NFL risking their earning potential in order 
to play injured.  
 For Hobbes, glory-seeking is a tool to be used for social advantage. It matters 
because it can be used it for advantage and power. Chapters X and XIII in The Leviathan 
most critically highlight this sentiment. Further support for the idea of glory-seeking 
being a weapon in the self-made man’s arsenal can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. The modern-day reflection of this idea is celebrity 
culture: the news and entertainment factory so woven into current American culture, 
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which is particularly embodied by the public behavior and lyrics of hip-hop artist Kanye 
West. 
 For Sartre, glory-seeking provides an answer to existential angst. It matters 
because it helps us believe that we matter. Sartre’s philosophical work, Being and 
Nothingness, as well as his existential novel, Nausea, provide ample evidence of this 
notion. More support for the idea of glory-seeking as a method of coping with the 
awareness one’s own existence can be found in Søren Kierkegaard’s The Present Age. 
Contemporary manifestations include the incessant self-promotion and self-presentation 
found on social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. 
 The goal of this work is to first investigate glory-seeking for Plato, Hobbes, and 
Sartre and analyze what each thinker has to say on the matter. After that, modern 
examples and additional input from other relevant philosophers will be assessed within 
the overall context of glory-seeking provided by Plato, Hobbes, and Sartre. Finally, I will 
attempt to synthesize all that has been presented thus far in order to answer the following 
question: Why does glory-seeking matter? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Glory-seeking as an Inherent Part of the Human Condition I: Plato 
What about an honor-lover? Doesn’t he think that the pleasure of making money is vulgar 
and that the pleasure of learning – except insofar as it brings him honor – is smoke and nonsense? – 
Plato, The Republic (Book IX, 581d) 
A natural place to begin when discussing glory-seeking is with Plato’s Republic, 
particularly the model of the tripartite soul. The Republic itself is divided into ten books, 
each being a series of dialectic arguments and sub-arguments between Socrates and a 
variety of other ancient Greeks as they search for the true meaning of justice and the 
model for an ideal community. These dialogues often illuminate other concepts as well – 
most notably the idea of tripartite soul and, of course, its glory-seeking portion, thumos. 
For Plato, the spirited portion of our soul (thumos) – along with the appetitive (eros 
and/or epithumétés) and the rational (logos) portions – is an inherent part of our being. It 
is a precondition of what it means to be human. Through careful analysis of the dialogues 
within Plato’s Republic, it soon becomes apparent that one reason glory-seeking matters 
is because it is an inescapable part of the human condition – not only on the individual 
level, but as a manifest force in the socio-political context as well.  
Particularly, Book I, Book IV, and Book IX of The Republic offer insight 
regarding glory-seeking and its intrinsic place within the human condition. In Book I, the 
dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus reveals many “thumotic” features of 
Thrasymachus and provides an example of how innate glory-seeking can affect one’s 
behavior and outlook on life in both an individual and social context. In Book IV, a 
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discussion on the ideal city leads to the model of the tripartite soul – the appetitive, the 
spirited (thumos), and the rational – and how that individual, intrinsic structure 
corresponds to a political city divided into three corresponding classes – producers, 
guardians (thumos), and rulers, respectively. Finally, in Book IX, Socrates, in an effort to 
argue for the superiority of the life of the philosopher in a society, assesses both the 
money-lover and the honor-lover and how the inescapable flame of thumos burning from 
within the soul fuels the actions of the honor-lover. Thus, through examination of Plato’s 
Republic, it becomes clear that glory-seeking matters because it is an inherent part of the 
human condition and carries importance for both individual and socio-political reasons. 
In Book I of The Republic, the discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus 
exposes some thumotic features of Thrasymachus, which consequently illuminate how 
glory-seeking from within an individual’s soul can become manifest in that individual’s 
being. There are a four distinct pieces of evidence within the dialogues in Book I 
connecting Thrasymachus to thumos, as J.R.S Wilson summarizes: 
First, images used in relation to Thrasymachus are also used in relation to the 
thumos, establishing a symbolic connection which can hardly be coincidental. 
Secondly, the temper that Thrasymachus displays and his argumentative impulse 
and style are characteristic of thumos in its pathological aspect. Thirdly, 
Thrasymachus interprets Socrates' motives as if these too sprang from thumos. 
Fourthly, the substance of what he says – his account of justice and the view of 
human reality which underlies it – is infused with thumoeidic features.3 
 
The first point Wilson makes regards the descriptive – and decidedly, thumotic – nature 
of the words and images Plato invokes to characterize Thrasymachus as he engages in 
dialogue with Socrates over the concept of justice. Thrasymachus’s very entrance into the 
                                                
3 Wilson, J.R.S. “Thrasymachus and the Thumos: A Further Case of Prolepsis in Republic I.” The Classical 
Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1995), pp. 58-67. Cambridge University Press. pg. 58-59. 
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discussion comes from a slow boil in which “he couldn’t keep quiet any longer” and 
“coiled himself up like a wild beast about to spring, and he hurled himself at [Socrates 
and Polemarchus] as if to tear [them] to pieces” (336b). Plato later compares 
Thrasymachus to a lion, as, through the voice of Socrates, he quips, “Do you think that 
I’m crazy enough to try to shave a lion or to bear false witness against Thrasymachus?” 
(341b). Both of these primal, thumotic images that Plato uses in his depiction of 
Thrasymachus – a coiled beast ready to strike and a formidable lion – imply that glory-
seeking is an natural (and possibly animalistic) condition that exhibits itself in an 
individual’s character and behavior. 
 Additionally, Thrasymachus’s temper and argumentative style, his interpretations 
of Socrates’s motives, and the substance of what he actually says regarding justice are all 
reflective of the glory-seeking within his being.4 Perhaps the most reflective element of 
the swollen thumos within Thrasymachus is that at one point Socrates says that “it was 
obvious that Thrasymachus thought he had a fine answer and that he wanted to earn [the 
onlooker’s] admiration by giving it” (338a). Wilson elucidates the implications of this 
critical passage: 
For Thrasymachus, victory appears to be all-important. The dialogue in which he 
is engaged is a contest. He is out both to win that contest and to win credit in the 
eyes of those observing it. This thumoeidic approach to argument will be 
demonstrated at its clearest when…we consider the repeated and almost desperate 
resistance which Thrasymachus puts up before conceding the points made against 
him by Socrates. When at the climax of these exchanges he finds himself unable 
to rebut Socrates' proof that the just man is also good and wise, he is shamed, and, 
for the first time in Socrates' experience, blushes (350d). Shame, like anger, is a 
feeling rooted in thumos.5 
                                                
4 Ibid, pg. 60. 
5 Ibid, pg. 61. 
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Thrasymachus’s interpretations of Socrates’s motives are also indicative of 
Plato’s view of glory-seeking being an inescapable part of the human condition. Upon 
joining the conversation, Thrasymachus almost immediately accuses Socrates of “asking 
questions and then refuting answers simply to satisfy [his] competitiveness or love of 
honor” (336c) and then later assumes that Socrates is trying simply to win an argument, 
proudly claiming that Socrates will “never be able to overpower [him] in an argument” 
(341b). Moreover, Thrasymachus attempts to shame Socrates rather than answering his 
questions – asking if he still has a “wet nurse” who lets him run around with a “snotty 
nose” (343a) and later offers to take his argument and aggressively “pour it into 
[Socrates’s] very soul” (345b). Such an insult is meant to provoke the thumos within 
Socrates, and the assumption that it would indeed offend Socrates is natural for the 
thumotic Thrasymachus. Plato recognizes glory-seeking as innate enough as to have its 
embodiment, Thrasymachus, project his own honor-driven motivations onto Socrates, 
who, for Plato, is in actuality driven by the truth-seeking part of soul, the rational (logos). 
It is in this way that glory-seeking informs not only how Thrasymachus behaves, but how 
he views other individuals and their behaviors as well. 
 Finally, the very content of Thrasymachus’s argument for justice shows how 
glory-seeking is an inherent part of an individual’s being. Thrasymachus’s definition of 
justice, of course, as an individual driven primarily by thumos, is “the advantage of the 
stronger” (339a). As Wilson notes, “one of the characteristic desires attributed to thumos 
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is the desire for power or domination over others”6 – a dichotomy of strong and weak, 
ruler and ruled. Wilson reasons that “it is through the perspective of these thumoeidic 
polarities” that Thrasymachus views the human condition. When considered alongside 
the thumotic imagery Plato uses to describe Thrasymachus, Plato’s depiction of 
Thrasymachus’s temper and argumentative persona, and Plato’s noting of how 
Thrasymachus interprets Socrates’s motives for having a dialogue in the first place, it 
appears as though Plato is saying that the “advantage of the stronger” argument comes 
not only from Thrasymachus, but from his inflated thumos and glory-seeking portion of 
his soul. It is in this way that the discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus 
illustrates how glory-seeking – as an inherent part of the human condition – can manifest 
itself not only in an individual’s behavior, but also in how that individual views and 
consequently participates in their particular society or political sphere. 
In Book IV of The Republic, a dialogue regarding the ideal city leads to the model 
of the tripartite soul – a soul composed of appetitive, spirited (thumos), and rational parts. 
That individual, intrinsic structure consequently begets a socio-political city divided into 
three corresponding classes – producers, guardians (thumos), and rulers, respectively. 
Beyond the explicit identification of thumos as a separate third of each individual’s soul, 
Plato, through the character of Socrates, investigates the soul in its social manifestation: 
the guardians of the ideal city. The most thumotic or glory-driven people are a natural 
choice for defense, as Plato illuminates through the depiction of fiery passion that 
Socrates describes as burning at the core of a glory-seeker: 
                                                
6 Ibid, pg. 61. 
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But what happens if, instead, he believes that someone has been unjust to him? 
Isn’t the spirit within him boiling and angry, fighting for what he believes to be 
just? Won’t it endure hunger, cold, and the like and keep on till it is victorious, 
not ceasing from noble actions until it either wins, dies, or calms down, called to 
heel by the reason within him, like a dog by a shepherd? Spirit is certainly like 
that. (440c-d) 
 
As Hanne Andrea Kraugerud explains, it is the “urge for honor and victory that 
makes thumos a necessary component in the virtue of courage, and explains why it is the 
part of the soul especially valuable and relevant for the guardians of the city.”7 The 
resemblance of thumos and glory-seeking is what compels scholars such as Simon 
Blackburn to describe the thumotic character of Achilles as “the ultimate action-man, the 
embodiment of touchy honor and military heroism.”8 Even Plato cannot resist a nod to 
the Homeric model for the ideal guardian of the ideal city, as Socrates mentions an 
“earlier quotation from Homer” in which Achilles “struck his chest and spoke to his 
heart” (441b). The invocation of heart – from which, etymologically, the thumos-soaked 
word courage (from the Latin cor, meaning ‘heart’) comes from and, like the glory-
seeking portion of the soul, resides within each individual – and how the heart is an 
inseparable component of thumos, further supports the Platonic idea that glory-seeking 
matters because it is an inherent, inescapable, and innate part of one’s very being. 
 Kraugerud points to another classically Platonic image regarding the soul in her 
examination of what glory-seeking means for Plato – the famous charioteer in Phaedrus: 
The horse that is on the right, or nobler, side is upright in frame and well jointed, 
with a high neck and a regal nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, and he is a 
                                                
7 Kraugerud, Hanne Andrea. “‘Essentially Social’? A Discussion of the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato.” 
European Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 4 (2010): pg. 481–494. Pg. 484-485. 
8 Blackburn, S. (2006), Plato’s Republic. London: Atlantic Books. Pg. 76 
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lover of honor with modesty and self-control; companion to true glory, he needs 
no whip, and is guided by verbal commands alone (Phaedrus 253d-e).9 
 
Even in a separate portrait of the soul, Plato does not deny the innateness of glory-
seeking. As Kraugerud observes, he also believes that “the spirited part can be more or 
less successfully bred and trained”,10 which implies that it is an inherent force that can be 
harnessed for good or let run wild for harm. Of course, the realm where this “good” or 
“harm” would manifest itself is the socio-political sphere in which individuals – who are 
dealing with and managing their respective inner “chariots” – reside and participate. It is 
in this regard that glory-seeking is something that matters. Both the tripartite soul model 
set forth in Book IV of The Republic and the charioteer model found in Phaedrus 
highlight glory-seeking for Plato as an inherent part of an individual’s being – something 
that matters because it is an inescapable and innate part of the human experience on both 
the individual and socio-political levels. 
Finally, in Book IX of The Republic, Socrates, in an effort to argue for the 
superiority of the life of the philosopher, assesses both the money-lover and the honor-
lover and how the intrinsic flame of thumos burning from within the soul fuels the actions 
of the honor-lover. Socrates reasons that “the spirited part” of the soul – the part which 
drives the honor-lover – is “wholly dedicated to the pursuit of control, victory, and high 
repute” (581a). For Socrates (and by proxy, Plato), these cravings are seen as less than 
ideal since the highest calling of the soul is that of the philosopher: the rational and truth-
seeking. Later in Book IX, thumotic indulgences such as “flattery and slavishness” are 
                                                
9 Kraugerud, Hanne Andrea. “‘Essentially Social’? A Discussion of the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato.” 
European Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 4 (2010): pg. 481–494. Pg. 486. 
10 Ibid, pg. 486. 
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condemned, primarily because “they subject the spirited part to the moblike beast, 
accustoming it from youth on to being insulted for the sake of the money needed to 
satisfy the beast’s appetites, so that it becomes an ape instead of a lion” (590b). It is this 
corruption of thumotic desire that characterizes the tyrant – the degenerate foil to the 
highly regarded philosopher-king and the socio-political (in this case, dystopian) 
consequence of an empowered individual’s glory-seeking appetite run wild.  
Whereas the philosopher-king is ruled by balanced rationality, the tyrant is 
consumed by appetite, which in turn then twists his thumotic, glory-seeking desires into 
perverse servants for the unchecked appetitive soul. As scholar Pierre Destrée explains, 
“the tyrant is the one who because of neglecting the ‘muse’ and philosophy (probably 
both the right poetical and the philosophical educations) has become the slave of his 
appetites, being the representation of a person who lives his dreams for real.”11 Plato sets 
forth this sentiment through the voice of Socrates as well, who says: “Now however, 
under the tyranny of erotic love [eros, the appetitive soul], he [the tyrant] has 
permanently become while awake what he used to become occasionally while asleep, and 
he won’t hold back from any terrible murder or from any kind of food or act” (574e). 
While the text of The Republic focuses on the appetitive as the primary corrupter of the 
soul, implicit in that is a corruption of the spirited portion, thumos. Pierre Destrée 
elaborates: 
Now, in this very vivid depiction, especially in Book IX, Plato is both reminding 
his readers of his tri-partite theory of the soul and emphasizing that the tyrant’s 
soul is now totally ruled by his appetites. So this does mean that the philosopher’s 
                                                
11 Destrée, Pierre. "Poetry, Thumos, and Pity in the Republic." Plato and the Poets. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pg. 
267-281 Print. 
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thumoeides has now come totally under the control of the appetites, and does not 
at all obey his reason anymore. In other words, the philosopher’s properly 
educated thumoeides has completely ‘degenerated’ into a thumoeides that has 
completely turned amok at the service of his appetites…Instead of being, like a 
lion, strongly willing to fight against his appetites, the thumoeides of the 
philosopher-turned-tyrant is now at the service of the appetites to help them make 
their way…In other words, his thumoeides has simply become almost 
undistinguishable from his appetites; these two irrational parts of his soul are now 
ruling over his entire soul, having destroyed (or at least put into silence) its 
rational part. It is no surprise then that in fact Plato does not explicitly mention 
thumoeides by name anymore in his description of the tyrant, as this part has now 
completely fused with the appetitive part.12 
 
In this regard, glory-seeking exists for Plato as an inescapable inner force to be reckoned 
with for each individual as they pursue philosopher-king tendencies or tyrannical ones 
within the socio-political sphere. Glory-seeking ultimately matters because it can guide 
thoughts and actions, as it literally does in the case of the charioteer depiction found in 
Plato’s Phaedrus. As Destrée observes, the place of glory-seeking in the soul is that of 
“an intermediate part which can make its alliance either with the appetitive part or with 
reason. But being intermediate, it can be pulled by both other parts at the very same 
time.”13 Whether the white horse of thumos obeys the charioteer’s reason (as it does in 
the image of the Phaedrus) or runs wild with the black horse of eros, it exists as within 
the soul nonetheless as an inescapable and innate part of the human experience. 
In this way, it becomes clear that glory-seeking matters – at least in part – because 
it is an inherent part of the human condition with implications at both the individual and 
socio-political levels. Glory-seeking will therefore inform not only how an individual 
behaves, but how a society functions as well. In Book I, the exchange between Socrates 
                                                
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
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and Thrasymachus reveals strikingly thumotic features of Thrasymachus, thus 
exemplifying how an inborn desire for glory can manifest itself in an individual’s persona 
and worldview. In Book IV, through the model of the tripartite soul, Plato shows how an 
individual, intrinsic structure produces a political city that is divided into three 
corresponding classes depending on which part of the soul is favored by each individual 
citizen. Likewise, the charioteer model of the soul found in Phaedrus also provides 
insight into the internal struggle among between logos, eros, and thumos. Finally, in 
Book IX, glory-seeking holds significance for Plato as an inner force to be reckoned with 
for each individual, as they pursue glory either as truth-loving, philosopher-kings or 
overly appetitive and thumotic tyrants. Thus, ultimately for Plato, glory-seeking matters 
as a condition of what it means to be human – as both an individual in-and-of-oneself, 
and also as a citizen within society at large. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Glory-seeking as Socially Advantageous I: Thomas Hobbes 
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, 
Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the 
third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, 
wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a 
different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in 
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name – Thomas Hobbes, The 
Leviathan (Ch.XIII, Para. 6-7). 
Glory-seeking wasn’t just a concept that the ancient Greeks recognized and wrote 
about – Enlightenment thinkers also acknowledged this innate need within human beings 
for recognition, respect, glory, and honor as well. Notably, seventeenth century 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes – most famous for his work, The Leviathan – recognized 
that this inherent propensity for human beings to seek glory is something that humans not 
only realize within themselves, but manipulate and influence amongst others in the social 
sphere as well. For Hobbes, glory-seeking is a tool to be used throughout one’s life and 
social existence – what he refers to as “the natural state of war,” a war that all of 
humanity is born into. Glory-seeking thus matters according to Hobbes as something that 
can be used to one’s advantage when socially navigating the innate glory-seeking desires 
of oneself with regards to the same motivations within others. That is, glory-seeking is 
not merely a means towards glory alone, but rather a means towards satisfying the deeper 
and innate thumotic drive for advantage over others. 
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Beginning in Chapter X of The Leviathan, Hobbes philosophically develops 
working definitions of individual, glory-satiating and advantage-wielding rewards – those 
“Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthinesse.” Soon after, in Chapter XIII, “Of 
the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning their Felicity, and Misery,” glory-
seeking is again highlighted as a tool to be used in the natural state of war and 
competition caused by human freedom, perhaps as a means towards advantages given by 
the advantageous, glory-satiating rewards outlined in Chapter X. The method of 
investigating why glory-seeking matters according to Hobbes will be twofold: First, an 
analysis of the socially advantageous fruits of glory-seeking presented in Chapter X and, 
then, a consequential examination of how and why those fruits can be obtained by 
seeking individual glory within an artificial society born out of the natural state of war 
offered in Chapter XIII. Ultimately, for Hobbes, glory-seeking matters because it is a tool 
to be used to one’s social advantage – as one navigates the innate glory-seeking desires of 
oneself with regards to the same glory-seeking motivations of others in the natural state 
of war, those who are able to master the art of glory-seeking within their respective social 
sphere will find themselves rewarded with glory-satiating and advantage-wielding Power, 
Worth, Dignity, Honor, and Worthiness. 
In Chapter X of The Leviathan, entitled “Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and 
Worthinesse,” Hobbes develops philosophical working definitions for each glory-
satiating and advantage-wielding prize mentioned in the chapter’s title that collectively 
begin to illuminate how glory-seeking matters as a tool for one’s social advantage. Each 
term is conceptually close in relation with each of the others, as well as with the concepts 
 
 
17 
of glory-seeking and advantage, and, accordingly, Hobbes uses Chapter X in order to 
investigate the various reasons one might seek glory via examination of these 
advantageous fruits of glory-seeking labor. Each aforementioned glory-satiating and 
advantage-wielding reward is defined by Hobbes in Chapter X of The Leviathan as 
follows: 
Power - The Power of a Man, (to take it Universally), is his present means, to 
obtain some future apparent Good (Leviathan, Ch. X, Para. 1). 
 
Worth – The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is 
to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not 
absolute; but a thing dependant on the need of judgement of another (Ch.X, Para. 
15). 
 
Dignity – The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the 
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call Dignity. (Ch. X, Para. 17). 
 
Honour – To pray to another, for ayde of any kind…to obey…to give great gifts 
to a man…to be sedulous in promoting anothers goods; also to flatter…to give 
way or place to another in any Commodity…to show any signe of love, or feare 
of another…to praise, magnifie, or call happy…to speak to another with 
consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility…to believe, to 
trust, to rely on another…to hearken to a man’s counsell, or discourse of what 
kind soever…to do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, 
or which the Law or Custome makes so…to agree with in opinion…to imitate…to 
honour those another honours…to employ in counsell, or in actions of 
difficulty…is to Honour. (Ch. X, Para. 18-32). 
 
Worthinesse – Worthinesse, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; 
and also from his merit or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability 
for that, whereof he is said to be worth: which particular ability, is usually named 
Fitnesse, or Aptitude (Ch. X, Para. 52). 
 
Each working definition of the glory-satiating and advantage-wielding rewards presented 
by Hobbes touch not only on the end-games of glory-seeking, but on the method as well: 
Power is presented as a “means to a future good”, with the ‘good’ being advantage over 
others as well as the glorified recognition of that advantage from others. Worth is defined 
as a measurement of that Power, or a way to relatively quantify one glory-seeking 
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individual’s advantage (or disadvantage) with respect to other glory-seeking individuals 
within the same social sphere. 
Dignity is the public value set on someone by their respective society, which is 
much like Worth but in a more conceptually normative sense. In whatever societal norms 
governing how individuals with advantage ‘should’ behave operate as a measuring stick 
for those glory-seekers who have successfully won advantage and, therefore, holds 
importance for these ‘winners’ in order for them to maintain their glorified status of 
advantageous recognition in the ‘public’ eye. Honor is a multi-faceted verb with a 
laundry-list of how to honor others via feeding their glory-seeking souls, essentially 
serving as the way in which thumotic advantage is transferred from one glory-seeker to 
another. Worthiness is respect or recognition due to one’s advantage-wielding ability or 
Fitness regarding one’s particular position of advantage. Through all of these definitions, 
Hobbes begins to lay the groundwork for the notion that glory-seeking is a tool that can 
be used for one’s social advantage. 
 Hobbes’s concept of Power is particularly interesting with regard to the idea of 
glory-seeking as an advantageous social tool to be used within the human experience. 
Scholar John Dunn explains: 
To see that power plays a very special role in Hobbes’s conception of what human 
life is like, and register the sheer force of that conception within our own 
imaginations, consider what he says in his early work The Elements of Law about 
the Passions of the Mind… Amongst those passions, Hobbes mentions and 
analyses here glory or pride, humility, shame, courage, anger, revengefulness, 
repentance, hope, trust, pity, indignation, emulation, laughter (very strikingly), 
weeping, lust, love, charity, admiration, curiosity, magnanimity and pusillanimity. 
Most of these passions, on his account, turn on or consist in relations of power. 
Glory, for example, ‘proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own 
power, above the power of him that contesteth with us’ (The Elements of Law, p. 
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50)....Power is an exhausting quarry to pursue because it can never be captured; 
but its relativity makes it also an unnerving preoccupation. Sometimes it 
accumulates under its own momentum, ‘like Fame, increasing as it proceeds, or 
like the motion of heavy bodies, which the farther they go, make still the more 
hast’ (The Leviathan, Chapter X, Para. 2). But it can also deflate, apparently under 
just the same momentum. Nothing succeeds like success; but nothing, too, can fail 
quite like failure. Hobbes’s picture of what life is like is not a comforting one, and 
it leaves out a good deal. But there is something eerily persuasive about it.14 
 
Power, in this way, for Hobbes, is both an end and a means of glory-seeking, as the 
pursuit of power and glory both aim to quench the various and insatiable thumotic 
passions rife throughout the human experience. Accordingly, Glory, for Hobbes, is not 
only a means to socially advantageous Power, but also an end of Power itself. Hobbesian 
notions of Power and Glory are thus entangled in a cycle in which the first begets the 
second which begets the first – with every powerful and glorious result satiating a deeper 
and innate thumotic drive for advantage over others. Yet, this much-sought after 
advantage over others is not easily won or easily held. Power itself is fleeting and fickle 
because it necessarily depends on the relative power of others – in a room full of kings, 
who would be chosen ruler? Or, rather, in the Hobbesian framework, the ‘public’ holds a 
form of advantage over those who seek it, because they are the ones who ultimately 
determine who is rewarded with “Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthinesse.” In 
this regard, Hobbes’s concept of Power, as presented in Chapter X of The Leviathan 
serves as a compelling argument that glory-seeking is in fact a tool for individuals to use 
to their social advantage, with the social instability of that Power towards Glory (or Glory 
                                                
14 Dunn, John. “The Significance of Hobbes’s Conception of Power.” Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy (2010), 13:2-3, 417-433. Pg. 421, Pg. 424. 
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towards Power) serving as a natural and essential ingredient to Hobbes’s most famous 
idea: that man is born into a natural state of war against all men. 
In Chapter XIII of The Leviathan, “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as 
Concerning their Felicity, and Misery,” Hobbes’s philosophical model of the natural state 
of war further clarifies the Hobbesian view of glory-seeking as a tool to be used to one’s 
social advantage, especially when considered with the groundwork concepts from 
Chapter X in mind. Chapter XIII begins by positing that “Nature hath made men so 
equall” that “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret 
machination, or by confederacy with others” (Chapter XIII, Para. 1). Hobbes continues to 
reason that “from this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in attaining of our 
Ends” and if “any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both 
enjoy, they become enemies” (Chapter XIII, Para. 3). Continuing the argument, “from 
this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself” and, 
because all men have the ability to kill each other, they thus “have no pleasure (but on the 
contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to 
over-awe them all” (Chapter XIII, Para. 4-5). This logic – that from equality comes 
diffidence and from diffidence, violence – is the argument behind Hobbes’s need for a 
‘Leviathan’ and social contract through which a strong government can keep its citizens 
pugnacious tendencies in check. As Hobbes explains, “during the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; 
and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man” (Chapter XIII, Para. 8). Thus is 
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the Hobbesian “natural state of war”, born from the natural freedom and equality of 
humanity. 
The natural propensity to seek glory and advantage also figures into the “natural state 
of war” via the Hobbesian concept of Power with regard to the “principal causes of 
quarrel.” The concept of Power and its thumotic associates (Glory, Worth, Dignity, 
Honour, and Worthinesse) outlined in Chapter X bear much weight towards the idea of 
glory-seeking as socially advantageous tool when contextualized with the “principal 
causes of quarrel” as explained by Hobbes in Chapter XIII: 
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, 
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for 
Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to 
make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the 
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, 
and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in 
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name (Ch.XIII, 
Para. 6-7). 
 
According to Hobbes, people quarrel due to competition (a concept with both appetitive 
and thumotic motivations), diffidence (appetitive and rational protective measures), and, 
most fascinatingly, for glory (which is purely thumotic). Petty things like “trifles, a word, 
a smile, a different opinion” are somehow grounds for one to quarrel (and perhaps kill) 
another. As scholar Arash Abizadeh explains:  
Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or 
because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are 
naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we 
are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures 
susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally 
inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory.15 
                                                
15 Abizadeh, Arash. “Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory.” American Political Science 
Review (2011), Vol. 105, No.2, Pg. 298-315. Pg. 298. 
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Hobbes, like Plato before him, recognized that human beings are innately glory-seeking 
creatures. However, for Hobbes, human beings are also naturally quarrelsome creatures 
who are in a constant state of war with one another. As humans individually seek Glory 
and Power – two concepts that necessarily depend on the valuation of other glory-seeking 
individuals – they are bound to conflict over anything that might offend their glory-
seeking souls. In other words, Hobbes recognizes that human beings are innately 
disposed to react to perceived insults, and, because Hobbesian Glory is produced by 
recognition of one’s Power (and vice-versa), the innate inclinations for human beings to 
seek glory and power also causes them to naturally be at war with each other. Abizadeh 
elaborates on this concept: 
Disagreement leads to war because humans are inclined to view its expression as 
a sign of contempt: To be contradicted by others, especially by a supposed 
equal—and sometimes especially if the disagreement concerns a mere “egg-
shell,” as Hamlet put it—is to suffer a blow to the glory and honor that humans 
typically desire. Thus, the problem in the state of nature is not simply that without 
an enforced common procedure for settling disputes about right action, conflicts 
stemming from other sources—competition or fear of death, for example—cannot 
be resolved. The problem is, rather, that the mere expression of disagreement is 
itself frequently the catalyst for war. Nor is violent conflict necessarily fueled by 
the aggressive desire to dominate others: Hobbes’s glory argument focuses 
instead on the more reactive disposition triggered by perceived insults in social 
interactions.16 
 
Abizadeh gets at the concept that our glory-seeking souls are not quite rational, and in 
many cases can be far from reason, causing seemingly avoidable aggression to take place. 
Plato, of course, observed this as well – the charioteer image in the Phaedrus with the 
rational logos being tasked with reigning in the irrational thumos and eros comes to mind. 
                                                
16 Ibid, pg. 299. 
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However, within Hobbes’s framework of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honor, and Worthiness 
and their grave importance to human beings, a mere Platonic observation of glory-
seeking as an irrational part of the human condition ignores the opportunity glory 
provides for those looking to gain from a world in which they are forced to socially 
coexist with others, virtually all of whom that have similar thumotic drive. That is, those 
who can successfully seek and obtain glory will naturally find themselves within reach of 
the thumotic and advantageous prizes of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honor, and Worthiness 
– the most important within a natural state of war being that of Power. In this way, glory-
seeking truly shapes the human experience within the social sphere, where individual 
glory-seekers interact with individual glory-seekers in a natural state of war-like 
competition for advantage over one another. Glory-seeking therefore matters in a 
Hobbesian way because it is a tool that can be used for individual advantage in the 
natural state of war. 
Ultimately, for Hobbes, glory-seeking matters because it is a tool to be used to 
one’s social advantage – as one navigates the innate glory-seeking desires of oneself with 
regards to the same glory-seeking motivations of others in the natural state of war, those 
who are able to master the art of glory-seeking within their respective social sphere will 
find themselves rewarded with glory-satiating and advantage-wielding Power, Worth, 
Dignity, Honor, and Worthiness. As Plato’s Phaedrus organizes the innate model of the 
human soul as logos taming eros and thumos on an individually valuable level, Hobbes’s 
three principal causes of quarrel can be organized on a socially useful level with Glory 
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shaping the ideological basis of both Competition and Diffidence.17 For Hobbes, glory-
seeking is not merely a means towards Glory alone, but rather a means towards the 
deeper and innate thumotic drive for advantage over others. In this way, through 
expansion on Plato’s view of glory-seeking as an inherent part of the human condition, 
glory-seeking matters according to Hobbes as an innate force that can be used to one’s 
advantage when socially navigating the innate glory-seeking desires of oneself with 
regards to the same glory-seeking desires residing within others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Ibid, pg. 300. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Glory-seeking as an Answer to Existential Angst I: Jean-Paul Sartre 
Shame reveals to me that I am this being, not in the mode of “was” or of “having to be” but in-itself. 
– Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Pt.3, Ch.1, Sec. IV: The Look) 
The human desire to seek glory can be seen as ultimately tied to how human 
beings cope with the anxiety of existential awareness – the awareness of their very 
existence in the world. Jean-Paul Sartre, in his philosophical treatise, Being and 
Nothingness and his existential novel, Nausea, illustrates the angst that comes from the 
dual awareness of the contingency of existence and the inevitability of freedom. Glory-
seeking, in this framework, provides an answer to existential angst – it is a cure to the 
Nausea created by existential awareness, awareness of contingency and freedom. Glory-
seeking thus matters in an existential way because it helps humans believe that they 
themselves matter via the recognition of the Others who are all around them. Thus, glory-
seeking, in a Sartrean sense, can be understood as an effort to remedy the Nausea caused 
by the awareness of one’s own simultaneously contingent and free existence – a method 
through which human beings flee shame and pursue its coveted inverse, pride, in what 
Sartre calls either “good” or “bad” faith. 
In understanding how Sartre would view glory-seeking, it is important to first 
examine his concepts of “bad faith” and “play-acting,” “the look” of “the Other,” and the 
Nausea of existential awareness itself, all within the context of his concepts of shame and 
its opposite, pride, the end of glory-seeking. Through an examination of Being and 
Nothingness and Nausea, glory-seeking will be shown to be a possible means through 
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which human beings can help themselves believe that they existentially and ultimately 
matter in an authentic (“good faith”) or inauthentic (“bad faith”) way, all in an attempt to 
cure the Nausea brought on by existential awareness. 
Towards the beginning of Being and Nothingness, Sartre outlines the concept of 
bad faith – a state of inauthentic living in which human beings negate what they are and 
“from themselves hide the truth” about their being (Being and Nothingness, Pt.1, Ch.2, 
Sec. I: Bad Faith and Falsehood). “The truth” that humans hide from via bad faith is their 
simultaneous existence as both a subject (“being-for-itself”) and an object (“being-in-
itself”) – a contingent existence that causes nauseous anxiety for those who become 
aware of and consequently dwell on it. This is existential awareness, the ontological root 
of existential angst and what Sartre refers to as Nausea. Understanding the significance of 
the freely taken act of negation of one’s existential awareness is perhaps the first critical 
step to understanding Sartrean shame and thus a Sartrean concept of glory-seeking. It is 
only through the free act of negation that a human being can pretend that he or she is 
either only a subject or only an object, taking solace in a prescribed identity-role rather 
than having anxiously to face the reality of free choice and vacillation between being 
both a “being-for-itself” (subject) when acting on others and a “being-in-itself” (object) 
when being acted upon by others. In other words, it is through inevitable freedom that 
one can deny and negate one’s own contingency in an effort to escape the Nausea that it 
causes. This self-deceptive avoidance of existential awareness and the resulting Nausea - 
which, for Sartre, is the unavoidable natural state of being that all human beings are 
thrown into at birth - is bad faith. 
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 It is important to note that bad faith, rather than an ignorant lie or general 
unawareness, is a conscious act of self-deception. As Sartre explains, “that which affects 
itself with bad faith must be conscious of its bad faith since the being of consciousness is 
consciousness of being” (Pt.1, Ch.2, Sec. I). For Sartre, bad faith is an internal and 
advantageous (at least in a short-term sense) inauthentic, self-deceptive effort to deal with 
shame, which stems from the anxiety of existential awareness in a world full of Others 
who remind one of one’s contingency. That is, shame of one’s true form as both a being-
in-itself and a being-for-itself (subject and object) is not only an impetus for bad faith, but 
also a continuous result of bad faith, since one who acts in bad faith is on some level 
aware that they are living a lie in an effort to combat shame and the Nausea caused by 
existential awareness. Conversely, good faith, which is also internal and advantageous 
(perhaps in a long-term way), can be understood as an honest recognition of the human 
propensity for bad faith and an acceptance, rather than negation, of the discomfort of 
existential awareness. That is, good faith is a conscious effort, through authentic and self-
honest living, not to fall into bad faith – this is an effort and mode of living that will no 
doubt yield a sense of pride, rather than shame. Glory-seeking can thus be understood as 
an authentic means towards pride (which I will refer to as true-pride, since it is achieved 
through authentic means) or an inauthentic means away from shame (or towards what I 
will refer to as false-pride, since it is reached in an inauthentic manner). 
Bad faith manifests itself in social situations by way of a process that Sartre calls 
“play-acting” – the role-playing efforts of humans which “all aim at establishing that they 
are not what they are” (Pt.1, Ch.2, Sec. II: Patterns of Bad Faith). The roles that are 
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played are advantageous in a Hobbesian sense, as they may in some cases provide social 
advantage, but in a Sartrean sense they are advantageous as a means to escape from the 
reality and anxiety (Nausea) of one’s true being as simultaneous subject and object. 
Sartre provides three chief examples of play-acting in Being and Nothingness: a 
seduction scene at a restaurant where a woman pushes off her decision to consent to or 
resist the lingering hand of her date; a waiter who takes on the role of the waiter as his 
definitive personal identity; and a homosexual who incessantly denies his sexuality in an 
over-compensatory manner (Pt.1, Ch.2, Sec. II). These three examples serve as 
manifestations of bad faith in the following respective ways: in the case of the woman, 
there is a prolonging of the decision to accept the inevitable reality of choice itself and, as 
a result, her bad faith effort to escape anxiety and freedom through lingering hesitation. 
In the case of the waiter, there is an over-affirmation of his occupation as an escape from 
anxiety and freedom. In the case of the denying homosexual, there is the over-negation of 
his true identity and actual being as an escape from anxiety and freedom. All three 
examples are in bad faith because, in each case, the actor is trying to become something 
he or she is not in an effort to flee from existential anxiety and Nausea stemming from 
the innate freedom of choice. Moreover, each actor in some way fails to freely exert his 
or her freedom in good faith by choosing not to choose and, in doing so, essentially lies 
to himself or herself: the first example of the woman is the choice not to choose through 
procrastinated indecision, the second example of the waiter is the choice not to choose 
through the affirmation of a pre-determined role which will thus make all of his decisions 
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for him, and the third example of the denying homosexual is the choice not to choose 
through a pre-determined identity negation that dictates his behavior at every turn. 
It is in this regard that play-acting is a bad faith manifestation of choosing not to 
choose, which, of course, is still a choice itself. Play-acting is a short-term advantageous 
effort to flee the hard truth of one’s own existence as both a subject and an object, and 
one’s inherent and inescapable freedom in the world. As Sartre puts it, in the process of 
play-acting, “I flee from myself, I escape myself, leaving my tattered garments in the 
hand of the fault-finder” (Pt.1, Ch.2, Sec. II). The phrase “fault-finder” is a key to 
beginning to understand Sartre’s notions of shame and pride, and, consequently, glory-
seeking - for it is others and only Others (as subjects) who can dictate fault, opinion, 
recognition, respect, glory, honor, pride, or shame for each individual (as an object). 
Thus, in relation to the overall glory-seeking context set forth by Plato and investigated 
further by Hobbes, Sartre’s addition to this developing concept of glory-seeking is the 
observation of bad-faith glory-seeking as a human’s effort to flee inherent shame (which 
is the inverse of pride and glory, as observed by Plato and by Sartre), moving instead 
towards inauthentic false-pride through the short-term, existentially advantageous (and 
perhaps socially advantageous in the Hobbesian sense) process of play-acting. 
Conversely, good-faith glory-seeking occurs when a human seeks true-pride through the 
existentially advantageous (and, again, possibly socially Hobbesian advantageous) 
process of authentically being what one actually is – as Sartre explains, “If man is what 
he is, bad faith is forever impossible and candor ceases to be his ideal and becomes 
instead his being” (Pt.1, Ch.2, Sec. II). In the Sartrean context of bad faith, good faith and 
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play-acting, glory-seeking emerges as a way in which human beings can feel as though 
they existentially matter in a world filled with other human beings. 
But what causes shame in the first place? To answer this question one must 
consider Sartre's concept of “the look of the Other.” Shame, for Sartre, is “shame of 
oneself before the Other,” yet at the same time, one “needs the Other in order to realize 
fully all the structures of [one’s] being,” highlighting once again the Nausea that can 
come from the existential awareness of contingency and freedom (Pt.3, Ch.1, Sec. I: The 
Problem). Much like Hobbesian glory via power or power via glory, shame for Sartre is a 
concept that completely depends on the opinions and recognition of other human beings 
through the dual, simultaneous subject-object relationships of human existence. Likewise, 
these aforementioned “structures of being” include the previously discussed reasons for 
glory-seeking, such as the inherent thumotic desire for glory (Plato), and the inherent use 
of glory-seeking towards advantageous power (Hobbes). These structures additionally 
include the bad faith or good faith movement towards pride and away from shame within 
a world filled with “Others” who are always “looking.” These Others do indeed satiate 
the innate Platonic desire for glory and the Hobbesian desire for advantage via glory, but 
most importantly, in an ultimate and existential sense, they satisfy the Sartrean desire to 
existentially matter, and to matter by means of recognition reflected back inward onto the 
self via “the look” - which can consequently carry an interpretation of pride or shame for 
the one who is being looked-at. As Sartre explains, “I recognize that I am as the Other 
sees me” (Pt.3, Ch.1, Sec. I).  
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It is through the look of the Other that one experiences pride or shame of one’s 
contingent ontological individual being, and, in a larger context, attains glory and value 
for their existential social being, since glory-seeking is also in part (according to Plato) an 
inherent structure of being – judged as a lone object by the numerous subjects whose 
recognition is sought. Lisa Guenther explains this relationship between the look of the 
Other and internally inherent structure towards shame: 
For Sartre, shame attests to a dimension of my own existence that does not 
originate in self-consciousness, but in my exposure to Others. I call this an 
ontological account of shame because it speaks to the structure…The gaze [look] 
of the Other does not offer me anything in particular to know; rather, it alters my 
being, triangulating the structure of my existence into a relation between me, 
myself and the Other.18 
 
This triangulation via “the look” of me, myself, and the Other can be understood in terms 
of good faith and bad faith as follows: when “me” (true-self) equals “myself” (self-
presented identity) regardless of the Other, then one is living authentically in good faith, 
whereas when “myself” equals the projected expectations of the Other regardless of 
“me,” then one is living in inauthentically in bad faith. Connecting back to the three 
examples of play-acting, which is a means through which human beings can exercise bad 
faith and escape the dual subject-object nature of themselves, sheds further light on 
Sartre’s analysis: the indecisive woman bases her “myself” (identity) on the projected 
expectations of her potential lover and chooses not to make a choice by pretending his 
hand is not actually resting on hers in a suggestive way. The obsessed waiter entirely 
throws his “myself” into what he believes the ideal role of a waiter is according to Others 
                                                
18 Guenther, L. “Shame and the Temporality of Social Life.” Continental Philosophy Review, 44(1). (2011).  
Pg. 23-39. Pg. 24,25. 
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and makes his identity and his occupation one and the same. The denying homosexual 
wholly negates his “me” (true-self) in an effort to construct a “myself” that he believes 
will be appealing to Others and thus goes to great lengths to falsely be perceived as 
heterosexual.  In this regard, what truly determines good faith or bad faith in a glory-
seeking sense is how one chooses to respond to the look of the Other, or, more broadly, 
how one chooses to use one’s inevitable freedom to respond to one’s nauseating 
contingency. Therefore, the choices that human beings make in their glory-seeking will 
either yield pride in a true-pride sense (good faith) or avoid shame in a false-pride sense 
(bad faith). In either case, existential glory-seeking is a choice made by human beings in 
an attempt to prove to themselves and all Others that they do indeed matter.  
At this point it is important to reexamine existential awareness and, more 
explicitly, the Nausea it causes. After all, Nausea is the ontological reason why human 
beings go to all of the trouble of play-acting in the first place. There is no better text that 
illustrates the inescapable, overwhelming, and discomforting force of existential 
awareness than Sartre’s Nausea. Nausea is the diary of Antoine Roquentin, a writer who 
one day begins to contemplate his existence and freedom in the world and, as a result, 
begins to feel an illness that he describes as “the filth, the Nausea.”19 This “Nausea,” or 
unsettling feeling of anxiety caused by way of existential awareness of both contingency 
and freedom, is unavoidable for Roquentin and it seeps into all of his social interactions 
with others, as well as his internal interactions with himself throughout the pages of his 
diary entries. Nausea can thus be understood as the result of existential awareness, not 
                                                
19 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Direction, 2007. Print. Pg. 18. 
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only in relation the contingent and anxious feeling caused by the look of the Other but 
also as an awareness of the look into one’s own self by way of reflection on the 
ontological state of one’s existence. Using inevitable freedom to navigate this 
phenomenon of Nausea caused by contingency can take both beneficial and detrimental 
forms: authentic good faith and inauthentic bad faith. 
The famous scene of Roquentin and the chestnut tree helps illustrate the larger 
contexts of glory-seeking and the Nausea of existential awareness. One day, Antoine 
finds himself sitting alone in a park, completely consumed by the prospect of existence in 
the world: 
The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground just under my bench. I 
couldn’t remember it was a root any more. The words had vanished and with 
them the significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of 
reference which men have traced on their surface…then I had this vision. It left 
me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of 
‘existence’…And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had 
suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it 
was the very past of things, this root was kneaded into existence…This moment 
was extraordinary. I was there, motionless and icy, plunged in a horrible 
ecstasy…I understood the Nausea, I possessed it…I was the root of the chestnut 
tree. Or rather I was entirely conscious of its existence. Still detached form it - 
since I was conscious of it - yet lost in it, nothing but it.20 
 
This scene effectively captures both the positive and negative aspects - “the horrible 
ecstasy” - of existential awareness, and thus the Nausea that stems from the vast freedom 
and disorienting contingency of human existence. This ontological Nausea ultimately 
births the Sartrean phenomena of good faith (positive), bad faith (negative), shame, and 
pride. Consequently, glory-seeking for Sartre cannot be fully understood without also 
understanding the magnitude of existential angst or Nausea for the human being. In fact, 
                                                
20 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Direction, 2007. Print. Pg. 126-131. 
 
 
34 
glory-seeking in an existential sense is in many ways a measured response - in either 
good faith or bad faith - to the Nausea of existential awareness.  
A good faith response to the Nausea of existential awareness would be to 
recognize it as an inherent an inescapable sickness or feeling, come to terms with that 
absurd reality of freedom and contingency, and thus advantageously pursue true-pride via 
authentic living. As Antoine realizes, “there is no half-way house between non-existence 
and this flaunting abundance. If you existed, you had to exist all the way, as far as 
mouldiness, bloatedness, obscenity were concerned.”21 In other words, existence is a 
total-package deal that, in good faith, must be accepted blemishes-and-all, as any denial 
or negation of those blemishes would be in bad faith. Accordingly, a bad faith response to 
the Nausea of existential awareness would be a negation or denial it itself, resulting in 
attempts to flee the consequential shame (or pursue a false-pride) via inauthentic living. 
Bad faith is a failure to understand that “the world of explanations and reasons is not the 
world of existence” and living as if they are, in denial of the grossly uncomfortable 
Nausea in realizing things actually “exist in such a way that you cannot explain them.”22 
Like the indecisive woman, the unctuous waiter, and the denying homosexual, one can 
distract oneself from facing one’s own absurd existence and freedom in the world with 
diversions, such as interpretations of Others, and do so in bad faith. The Nausea that 
comes from realizing one’s dual, contingent existence as a being-for-itself and a being-in-
itself is the root cause of this good faith or bad faith choice and, more specifically, the 
cause of good faith or bad faith glory-seeking: the one facing existential reality and 
                                                
21 Ibid, Pg. 128. 
22 Ibid, Pg. 129. 
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pursuing existentially-gratifying pride (true-pride), the other distracting himself or 
herself, avoiding (albeit temporarily) existentially-painful shame (false-pride). 
The look of the Other is also at play in the chestnut tree scene, and it effectively 
connects this notion of ontological Nausea back to both good faith and bad faith concepts 
of glory-seeking. The look of the Other is what immediately highlights one’s contingency 
and thus fuels the sticky, viscous, and gooey Nausea of existential self-awareness. This, 
in turn, contributes to shame via an internalization of the look of the Other. As Antoine 
stares and stares at the root of the chestnut tree, he realizes that humans and the world at 
large are “a heap of living creatures, irritated, embarrassed at ourselves, we hadn’t the 
slightest reason to be there, none of us, each one, confused, vaguely alarmed, feeling in 
the way in relation to the others.”23 It is this in the way feeling that serves as a literary and 
emotional expression of shame about the contingency that one is reminded of by the look 
of the Other – Antoine realizes that he “too was in the way.”24 It is the look of the Other 
which reminds human beings that they are in the way, or causes them to feel shame vis-à-
vis the Nausea of existential awareness.  Antoine is “uncomfortable because he was 
afraid of feeling” the Nausea, but even then fails to see that he is experiencing the Nausea 
already through this feeling of being uncomfortable in fear and shame.25 This, again, 
would be an example of bad faith with regard to the Nausea. Thus, bad faith glory-
seeking can be understood as an effort to flee shame at the look of the Other. Conversely, 
good faith glory-seeking is a means towards pride (true-pride) via authenticity. That is, 
                                                
23 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Direction, 2007. Print. Pg. 128. 
24 Ibid, Pg. 128. 
25 Ibid, Pg. 128. 
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pride is gleaned from recognizing the Nausea prompted by the look of the Other for what 
it is: the recognition that “no necessary being can explain existence,” that “all is free,” 
and that “contingency [with respect to Others] is not a delusion.”26 In other words, good 
faith glory-seeking is glory-seeking that accepts existence and its dual, contingent reality 
as a being both for-itself and in-itself, while bad faith glory-seeking is a glory-seeking 
that denies or negates the nature of existence. In either case, the actor uses freedom to 
seek glory as a way in which he or she can existentially matter: either inauthentically, if 
one is being what he or she is “for the Other” only in a sole attempt to gain the Other’s 
recognition, or authentically, if one is simply being what he or she actually is and, as a 
natural consequence, takes true-pride in doing so. 
 Ultimately, glory-seeking is a response to the Nausea of existential awareness. It 
is way through which human beings can existentially and ultimately matter in either an 
authentic (good faith) or inauthentic (bad faith) way. Through examination of the 
concepts bad faith, play-acting, the look of the Other, and existential Nausea as presented 
in Being and Nothingness and Nausea, working in conjunction with the notions of glory-
seeking as already presented by Plato and Hobbes, glory-seeking can be understood in an 
existential sense as a way to matter in a world of Others: in good faith towards true-pride 
or in bad faith away from shame (towards false-pride). As Sartre observes, “shame – like 
pride – is the apprehension of myself as a nature although that very nature escapes me 
and is unknowable as such. Strictly speaking, it is not that I perceive myself losing my 
freedom in order to become a thing, but my nature is – over there, outside my lived 
                                                
26 Ibid, Pg. 131. 
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freedom – as a given attribute of this being which I am for the Other (Pt.3, Ch.1, Sec. IV: 
The Look). Accordingly, in glory-seeking “for the Other,” one experiences the shame of 
living inauthentically in bad faith as a contingent object or being-in-itself for another. Yet 
one can take this very “apprehension of self” and transform it into a positive source of 
pride by glory-seeking authentically, in good faith awareness of the conditions that cause 
Nausea. That is, if one is seeking recognition not for its own sake (which would be 
inauthentic), but recognition for being what one authentically is, then one is glory-
seeking in good faith. In this way, glory-seeking is existentially advantageous because it 
allows one to exercise freedom and live either authentically and reap true-pride or 
inauthentically avoiding shame (reaping false-pride) – the relative long-term and lasting 
advantages, of course, lie with the choice of authenticity. Glory-seeking also deals with 
an inherent and inescapable problem of human existence: our ability to exist as we 
choose. Glory-seeking additionally lets the human being cope with shame and pursue 
pride, either in bad faith or good faith, ultimately allowing the individual to matter, either 
authentically or inauthentically. Therefore, ultimately, for Sartre, building off of the 
contextualized ideas of Plato and Hobbes, glory-seeking is inherent, advantageous, and, 
most importantly, a means towards existential meaning and value. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Glory-seeking as an Inherent Part of the Human Condition II: NFL 
Injuries 
 
Be a player, not a patient – Jason Taylor, former NFL Defensive End 
Plato’s Republic and Phaedrus aren’t the only ancient works to observe and 
comment on glory-seeking as an inherent part of the human experience. Homer’s Iliad 
also has something to offer with regard to the innate propensity for humans to seek glory. 
Looking around modern societies and the individuals who inhabit them today, one can 
find numerous manifestations of glory-seeking and, upon closer examination, evidence of 
its prevalence as well. This may or may not come as a surprise – after all, there is nothing 
new under the sun, especially supposedly innate and inescapable parts of the human 
condition.  
While many current examples can be found and analyzed regarding glory-
seeking, the one that primarily comes to mind for me is the case of professional athletes 
risking their health and earning potential to play injured. What – if anything – would 
Plato and Homer have to say about this phenomenon?  
While I’m not quite sure exactly how or in what way an ancient thinker would 
answer, however, given the texts they’ve left behind, I would imagine that the idea of an 
inherent, inescapable, and innate tendency for a human being to seek glory is at the center 
of whatever that answer ultimately would be. In this way, through applying the thoughts 
on glory-seeking presented in The Republic, Phaedrus, and The Iliad to glory-seeking 
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phenomena in the modern world today, the notion of glory-seeking as an inherent part of 
the human condition becomes less of an abstract theory and more of a concrete reality. 
Cultural Crossover: The Iliad and The NFL 
I’ve loved professional sports ever since I can remember. This is not unusual for 
modern day American boys. Growing up in the Philadelphia area, I have been rooting for 
the local teams - the Phillies, Eagles, Sixers, and Flyers – my entire life. Often times, on 
the playground or in the backyard as a young boy, I would pretend to be Sixers’ point-
guard Allen Iverson or Eagles’ quarterback Donovan McNabb during pick-up (and soon 
enough organized) games of basketball and football. These were my idols, my role 
models for what it meant to be an athlete. If it was a good reputation – or popularity, or 
respect, or honor, or glory – that I sought from my fellow young peers, how these players 
played was the model. 
My schoolyard friends and I are much older now, but the tales we reminisce about 
as young sports fans have remained for the most part the same: The way Allen Iverson, 
no matter how tired he was from being knocked down all game, would relentlessly attack 
the basket for forty-eight minutes night-in and night-out, seemingly willing the Sixers to 
victory through his brazen and admirable resolve. Or how Donovan McNabb, despite 
constant criticism from the Philadelphia media, would carry an undermanned Eagles 
offense and secure wins and division titles season-after-season – once, even throwing for 
four touchdowns while playing with a broken ankle!27 That broken-ankle game always 
sticks out to me, partially because it defies basic logic: Why in the hell would a 
                                                
27 ESPN, NFL. "Injured McNabb Leads Eagles in Rout." ESPN.com. STATS LLC and The Associated 
Press, 17 Nov. 2002. Web. < http://scores.espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId=221117021>. 
 
 
40 
professional athlete – someone whose entire livelihood depends directly on their body’s 
ability to perform within a short window of their life – ever risk playing injured? Of 
course, as a former football player myself (from third-grade through the end of high-
school), I’ve been told the answer since day one: sacrifice yourself for the good of the 
team! Be a warrior! But what does that even mean? What exactly is a warrior in the 
context of football and why does it matter – to me personally as well as to my team, and 
sometimes even more than my own health – that I be one? 
Achilles, of Homer’s Iliad and Greek lore, was the ideal warrior. In fact, he was 
so great that even the gods line up to watch his fights unfold, mirroring the way sports 
fans may support a favorite athlete today (Iliad, 20.29-30). The Iliad offers many 
examples of glory-seeking and often implies that glory-seeking is in fact an innate part of 
the human condition that each human being is forced to reckon with. Particularly, the 
characters of Achilles, Aeneas, and Hector all provide instances of inherent glory-seeking 
manifesting itself into one’s actions and decision-making. Ultimately, all three Homeric 
warriors find themselves risking their very lives to satiate their glory-seeking souls. 
In Book 18 of The Iliad, Achilles – after much war-waging between the Greeks 
and the Trojans – ultimately decides to seek glory at the expense of a longer, safer life on 
earth. After originally dropping out of the war and later questioning if the life of a solider 
is a life worth living, Achilles rejoins the fight with a vengeance after Patroclus is killed 
by Hector (18.107-109). While the original decision for Achilles not to fight appeals 
mostly to the appetitive and rational parts of the soul (the parts that would champion self-
preservation and non-violent ideals), Achilles actually withdraws from the war due to his 
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wounded thumos via public humiliation at the hands of an embarrassed and angry 
Agamemnon. King of kings, Agamemnon essentially takes the proud Achilles’s prized 
maiden, Briseis, from him in order to make up for the fact that Agamemnon’s maiden, 
Chryseis, needed to be returned to her father to lift a curse cast on the Achaeans by 
Apollo at his request (1.1-611). Pride, a concept closely connected with glory-seeking, is 
the greatest reason Achilles withdraws from the war. 
 Achilles later contemplates the “two clear courses to death’s end”: the one of the 
valiant solider, a short life which leads to “fame that is forever,” or one of returning home 
and “giving up such great renown” in exchange for “a life that is a long one” but certainly 
less memorable (9.410-416). Homer seems to imply that there is always an inherent price 
to glory-seeking and that there is good reason to sometimes consider that price too steep. 
However, the glory-seeking part of the soul is too important for Achilles, and, upon the 
death of his dear friend Patroclus, he chooses to fight once again, even while 
acknowledging that he is now destined for a short and glorious life, rather than a long and 
safe one (18.107-114). The pursuit of glory and honor – similar, if not congruent 
concepts – for Achilles is what drives his actions time and time again in The Iliad. Thus, 
through Achilles’s thumotic decisions, Homer identifies how glory-seeking is an 
inherently important factor for human beings – one that to some may even be worth a 
decidedly shorter life. 
In Book 20 of The Iliad, Aeneas almost dies due to his decision to fight Achilles, 
primarily based on glory-seeking. After Apollo encourages him to fight Achilles (20.123-
130), Aeneas is further praised by Hera who exclaims that he is “loved by the greatest 
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gods on high” (20.144).  This confidence boost by the deities pumps up Aeneas to the 
point that he recklessly challenges Achilles in battle, something he was even originally 
against doing when he wasn’t consumed by the appeal of seeking glory – as Aeneas had 
stated earlier, with a more level head, “It’s much against [his] will – [Achilles’] fury is 
overwhelming” (20.104).  Aeneas ends up getting beaten so badly that Poseidon has to 
intervene to save him from imminent death (I20.371-376).  Poseidon even chastises 
Aeneas for his lack of judgment and glory-seeking blindness: “Aeneas - what god on high 
commands you to play the madman? Fighting against Achilles’ overwhelming fury!” 
(20.378-380). By allowing the glory-seeking to inflate his confidence and overpower his 
rationality, Aeneas is almost destroyed on the battlefield. Consequently, his unchecked 
glory-seeking does a disservice not only to his well-being as individual (by virtue of 
almost dying), but his country as well. Again, Homer seems to be saying that glory-
seeking is an inherent question to be dealt with for human beings – one that matters 
enough to drive one to recklessly risk one’s life. 
Early on in The Iliad, Hector supposedly chooses to fight in order to protect his 
family, as evidenced by an intimate moment with his son and wife before he kisses them 
goodbye and goes off to war (6.575-589). However, just before he does so he explains 
that he seeks glory as well, wishing “to stand up bravely, always to fight in the front 
ranks of Trojan soldiers, winning my father great glory, glory for myself” (6.527-529). 
As the war wages on, King Priam eventually begs his son Hector to save himself rather 
than seek glory. However, Hector would rather save face than save his life, telling 
himself:  
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If I slip inside the gates and walls, Polydamas will be first to heap disgrace on 
me…Now my army’s ruined, thanks to my own reckless pride, I would die of 
shame to face the men of Troy…So, now, better by far for me to stand up to 
Achilles, kill him, come home alive or die at his hands in glory out before the 
walls (22.118-131).   
 
Eventually, when Hector does make his final charge, he even cries “Well let me die – but 
not without struggle, not without glory, no, in some great clash of arms that even men to 
come will hear of down the years!” (22.359-362). The effects of glory-seeking for Hector 
are two-fold: First, by allowing the assumed opinions of the people of Troy to affect his 
decision making, Hector literally destroys himself in an attempt to seek glory and avoid 
the shame of failure. Second, glory-seeking is also an inherent force for Hector, as 
assumptions he has about Trojan society and the societal value of glory-seeking could be 
rationally ignored in the face of his own mortality. In this regard, Homer implies that 
there is societal significance in how humans individually answer the inherent question of 
glory-seeking. As the tragedy of Hector – who is both a contributor and recipient of 
glory-seeking concepts within Trojan society – shows, individual lives and social wars 
can ultimately be at stake over the fundamental question of glory-seeking. 
In a sense, Homer uses the characters in The Iliad to teach lessons about the 
possible dangers of glory-seeking. Achilles is used to give warning to those who seek a 
glorious life; that it may come at the cost of being short-lived. Aeneas shows what can 
happen to individuals when they go against their better judgment and recklessly seek 
fame. Hector is used to demonstrate cultural and individual implications of glory-seeking 
and how those two spheres interact with each other when dealing with the question of 
glory-seeking.  
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A culture like this may, in some ways, seem ancient and no longer relevant, but 
the very same ideals regarding glory-seeking rule the sports world of current day – 
particularly the NFL. As Dan Le Batard of The Miami Herald observes in an interview 
with legendary defensive lineman Jason Taylor: 
As America’s most popular sport encounters a liability problem … as gladiator Junior 
Seau kills himself with a shotgun blast to the chest and leaves his damaged brain to 
study … as awareness and penalties increase around an NFL commissioner 
confronting the oxymoronic task of making a violent game safe … and as the rules 
change but the culture really doesn’t … we think we know this forever-growing 
monster we are cheering on Sundays. But we don’t. We have no earthly idea. 
Dolphins’ legend Jason Taylor, for example, grew up right before our eyes, from a 
skinny Akron kid to a future Hall of Famer, his very public path out in front of those 
lights for 15 years. But take a look at what was happening in the dark. He was just a 
few blessed hours from having his leg amputated. He played games, plural, with a 
hidden and taped catheter running from his armpit to his heart. His calf was oozing 
blood for so many months, from September of one year to February of another, that 
he had to have the equivalent of a drain installed. This is a story of the private pain 
endured in pursuit of public glory, just one man’s broken body on a battlefield littered 
with thousands of them. As death and depression and dementia addle football’s mind, 
persuading some of the gladiators to kill themselves as a solution to end all the pain, 
and as the media finally shines a light on football’s concussed skull at the very 
iceberg-top of the problem, we begin the anatomy of Taylor’s story at the very 
bottom.28 
 
Taylor – a “warrior” by any modern-day athletic use of the word – is just an example of 
what lengths NFL players will go to in order to be on the field, playing for their families 
and their teams. As Le Batard notes, like mostly anyone who has played football, “Taylor 
hated guys who ‘took up residency’ [in the training room]…he was proud to learn that 
one of his own quotes has been put up in there: Be a player, not a patient.”29  
                                                
28 Le Batard, Dan. "Jason Taylor's Pain Shows NFL's World of Hurt." The Miami Herald. 13 Jan. 2013. 
Web. 06 Oct. 2013. <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/01/13/v-fullstory/3179926/dan-le-batard-jason-
taylors-pain.html>. 
29 Ibid. 
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It is in this regard that the culture of glory-seeking and honor-seeking at all costs 
from Homer’s time permeates modern athletic culture. Homer may have even foreseen 
this connection between athletics and warfare – as the funeral games of Book 23 of The 
Iliad provide a less-bloody outlet for glory-seeking warriors. Unfortunately, while 
today’s NFL players may not be stabbing each other with spears, the relationship between 
glory-seeking at the expense of personal health remains a serious issue. For today’s 
athlete (and yesterday’s warrior), it is better to risk one’s health to fight on for one’s 
team. When put in the context with the idea of glory-seeking being an inherent part of the 
human soul, the logic oddly enough follows: If Achilles, Aeneas, and Hector were willing 
to die in pursuit of glory, honor, and fame, why shouldn’t an NFL player with similar 
motivations risk even something as serious as permanent brain injury in coming back 
from a concussion too soon? 
The truly strange thing is that it really is difficult not to admire or promote players 
with the attitude of Jason Taylor – a player who “would do it all again” even “if he had to 
sleep on the steps standing up for the next 15 years.”30 There’s always been cultural 
respect or honor – and fame or glory in especially impressive performances – for the 
injured athlete suiting up to play the game and give all of what they can for their team. 
Just ask Terrell Owens, who – on a not-quite-recovered broken leg – recorded nine 
catches for one-hundred and twenty-two yards in a losing Super Bowl effort.31 Even in a 
loss – and believe me, the city of Philadelphia does not take losses lightly (especially in 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 ESPN, NFL. “Playing Injured, Owens Still a Handful.” ESPN.com. Clayton, John. 6 Feb. 2005. Web. 
<http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs04/columns/story?columnist=clayton_john&id=1985765>. 
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the Super Bowl!) – Owens was showered with praise for what John Clayton of ESPN 
called, at the time, an effort that “might have been the most courageous performance in 
Super Bowl history.”32 Glory, honor, and the respect and admiration of both our peers 
and the general public matter to us as human beings – and as such, an athlete in a culture 
of glory-seekers will feed that inherent desire by forgoing what is best for their individual 
health and play injured. Glory-seeking must, therefore, in some way be an inherent desire 
of all human beings. Otherwise, warrior cultures would not be championed both in 
Homeric times and now currently in the modern day. After all, we aren’t barbarians 
anymore – right? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Glory-seeking as Socially Advantageous II: Celebrity Culture 
No one man should have all that Power – Kanye West, “Power”, My Beautiful Dark Twisted Fantasy 
Thomas Hobbe’s The Leviathan isn’t the only ancient work to observe and 
comment on glory-seeking as socially advantageous. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality also has something to offer with regard to how glory-seeking 
can be used as an advantageous tool amongst others in a society. In observing how 
modern societies operate today, one can find numerous manifestations of glory-seeking 
for social advantage. This should not come as a surprise – after all, many societies are 
built upon the principles set forth by political thinkers like Hobbes and Rousseau, and, of 
course, all societies are made of humans who, as Plato implies, have a natural part of 
their souls (thumos) that craves glory. 
While many current examples can be found and analyzed regarding glory-
seeking, the one that is of most interest to me is how individuals and society navigate the 
ubiquitous Celebrity Culture that has developed within the United States. What – if 
anything – would Hobbes and Rousseau have to say about this phenomenon?  
While I’m not quite sure how or in what way these political thinkers would 
answer, given the texts they’ve left behind, I would imagine that the idea of glory-seeking 
as a tool for social advantage is at the center of whatever that answer ultimately would 
be. In this way, through applying the thoughts on glory-seeking presented in The 
Levithan and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality to glory-seeking phenomena in the 
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modern world today, the notion of glory-seeking as socially advantageous becomes less 
of an abstract theory and more of an actualized reality. 
Cultural Crossover: Celebrity, Kanye, The Leviathan, and The Origin of Inequality 
 Every time I turn on the television, go online, or even casually talk to a friend, it 
seems that some kind of celebrity is inevitably mentioned within about five minutes. 
Given that these aren’t people that I know personally – but certainly do know of – I often 
wonder why it is that celebrities are a constant topic of conversation and, for many 
people, celebrity is a social goal to which they aspire. I certainly understand celebrity or 
glory for being superlatively talented: being the “best” in a society, especially if that 
“best” has an objective measure (such as dollars, home-runs, albums sold etc.). The truly 
puzzling aspect of modern celebrity culture for me is why there are a rapidly growing 
number of people who are famous for being famous. That is, they are glorified for being 
glorified. Just think of any reality TV show star, or perhaps someone specific such as 
Kim Kardashian – why is it that these seemingly ordinary or otherwise unimpressive 
people are constant conversation topics worldwide? More interestingly, even when 
someone is the “best” or at least “good” at something – like Ms. Kardashian’s talented-
yet-notorious recording artist fiancée Kanye West - why does this famous for being 
famous seemingly add more to their social celebrity than their talent or ability? Why does 
this intangible glory – whether it is good or bad – seem to socially trump tangible 
measures of greatness in celebrity culture? Why is it necessary that in order to have a 
long and successful run as a celebrity (talented or untalented), you must be good at being 
famous for being famous? 
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I think the answer has to do with glory-seeking and, specifically, the socially 
advantageous glory-seeking that appears to become intensified within a society of human 
beings who are all (or at least in part, according to Plato’s model of the soul) glory-
seekers. As noted by our previous analysis on The Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, Glory 
and Power – two concepts dependent on a society of others – exist in a continuously 
growing cycle in which glory can lead to more power and power can lead to more glory, 
and thus advantage over others in a social setting. In a celebrity culture, however, one 
gains glory for being the best at gaining glory. In this social glory-seeking context, being 
famous for being famous begins to make a little more sense: celebrities are so highly 
regarded in our society because, in a world of glory-seekers, they are the “best” at glory-
seeking. In Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, post-Enlightenment thinker Jean-
Jacques Rousseau further corroborates the Hobbesian theory of glory-seeking as socially 
advantageous by investigating the glory-based social dynamics that are at the root of 
modern celebrity culture. The preeminent current example of glory-seeking as social 
advantageous within modern celebrity culture is recording artist Kanye West – a man 
who understands and utilizes both Hobbesian glory-power dynamics, as well as takes 
advantage of Rousseauian glory-based social structures and, ultimately, the celebrity 
culture which they help create.  
In a Hobbesian glory-seeking sense, modern celebrity culture is best understood 
within the glory-via-power and power-via-glory growth cycle that culminates in social 
advantage through glory-seeking. “The Power of a Man”, according to Hobbes, “is his 
present means, to obtain some future apparent Good” (Leviathan, Ch. X, Para. 1). The 
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“Good” that is obtained in the case of celebrity culture is glory and, more specifically, the 
social advantage that comes from that glory. Likewise, for Hobbes, “Glory…‘proceedeth 
from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that 
contesteth with us’ (The Elements of Law, p. 50).33 In a world of glory-seekers, those who 
can seek glory the best will thus have power – they will be famous for being famous and 
be able to use that fame to influence others. Or, as Kanye West, one of most notorious 
celebrities and master glory-seekers of our time, said in an interview defending his 
interruption of country-pop singer Taylor Swifts’ acceptance speech at the MTV Music 
Video Awards in 2009, “I am so credible and so influential and so relevant that I will 
change things.”34 When asked about if his instinct to speak out at socially inappropriate 
times (take a minute to Google-search “George Bush”, “Kanye West”, and “Doesn’t Care 
About Black People” if you need an additional example), Kanye simply responded that, 
“It’s only led me to complete awesomeness at all times. It’s only led me to awesome truth 
and awesomeness. Beauty, truth, awesomeness. That’s all it is.”35 
Provocative statements and responses like these by West are something that, 
regardless of whether one may agree or disagree with them, embody what it means to be 
at the center of modern celebrity culture today – a cyclone of social power and glory. 
Kanye realizes that he has influence (power) via his celebrity (glory). He realizes that he 
is awesome (at least to himself) and has no problem expressing that “truth” to a public 
that helped shape that self-image in the first place. Interestingly enough, it’s probably that 
                                                
33 Dunn, John. “The Significance of Hobbes’s Conception of Power.” Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy (2010), 13:2-3, 417-433. Pg. 421, Pg. 424. 
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51 
self-awareness that offends the public (glory-givers) the most – after all, people don’t like 
to be reminded that someone has social advantage of any kind over them, even if that 
social advantage is derived from glory and fame freely given by society at large. 
Moreover and most importantly, quotes and controversial reactions from Kanye’s 
behavior within celebrity culture further evidences that merely being talented doesn’t 
carry the same social magnitude as being famous for being famous. That is, there are 
plenty of talented musicians in the world, but what sets Kanye apart and what gives him 
social advantage is his ability and willingness to constantly play the glory-seeking game 
at high-level and thus achieve both power and glory via celebrity culture – to be known 
and talented, rather than unknown and talented. This is particularly exemplified through 
the fact that most of his notoriety is obtained from public comments, rather than only 
album sales. David Samuels of The Atlantic explains: 
Whatever you think of the many controversies he has ignited, you must admit that 
Kanye West is at least some kind of musical genius, ranking among the top five 
producers and the top five rappers of the past decade. (His singing, by contrast, is 
kind of a joke.) Every one of his five solo albums has gone platinum, and he has 
sold 30 million digital downloads of his songs, to become one of the most 
downloaded musical artists of all time. He has won 18 Grammys—the most of 
any artist in the past 10 years—while serving as a backpack-wearing icon of black 
nerd chic. Kanye’s power resides in his wild creativity and expressiveness, his 
mastery of form, and his deep and uncompromising attachment to a self-made 
aesthetic that he expresses through means that are entirely of the moment: rap 
music, digital downloads, fashion, Twitter, blogs, live streaming video. He is the 
first true genius of the iPhone era, the Mozart of contemporary American music, 
intent on using his creative and emotional gifts to express the heartbreaks and 
fantasies of his audience.36 
 
                                                
36 Samuels, David. "American Mozart." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 02 Apr. 2012. Web. 09 
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 As the “first true genius of the iPhone era” – a celebrity who can cash-in on the 
panoptical presence of social-media and thus increase fame for being famous via online 
buzz about whatever he is saying, thinking, doing, singing, or wearing – Kanye West is 
able to use glory-seeking to his advantage through the Hobbesian increasing power-via-
glory and glory-via-power cycle. In doing so, what becomes socially important (and 
advantageous) is not necessarily West’s talent as a musician, but the fact that he is 
constantly able to be the topic of many conversations, often for his non-musical activities. 
This is the epitome glory-seeking for social advantage and what makes being famous for 
being famous infinitely more valuable in a social sense than merely being talented. After 
all, all of the talent in the world can’t make people recognize an unknown-but-talented 
musician – but successful glory-seeking can. Perhaps Kanye is even able to increase his 
status as a musician through his glory-seeking – owning ends like power and glory 
certainly can’t hurt when the Grammys are given and new records are released.  It is in 
this regard, West serves as a current case for how the Hobbesian notion of glory-seeking 
manifests itself in modern celebrity culture. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a post-Enlightenment thinker who was in many ways a 
critic of Hobbes, happened to have quite similar and complementary observations of 
power and glory reacting together within a society – the word he chose to use was 
“esteem.” Accordingly, his philosophy offers additional insight into the glory-seeking 
dynamics of modern celebrity culture. In Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Rousseau 
depicts the development of a type of primitive celebrity culture: 
People grew accused to gather in front of their huts or around a large tree; song 
and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the 
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occupation of idle men and women who had flocked together. Each one began to 
look at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a 
value. The one who sang or danced the best, the handsomest, the strongest, the 
most adroit or the most eloquent became the most highly regarded.37 
 
Out of idleness was born entertainment, and out of entertainment, an esteem-based 
celebrity culture where those “who sang or danced the best” soon “became the most 
highly regarded.” This, of course, persists in a much larger way today – where what was 
once a few people standing around trees looking to dole out some praise for 
entertainment has turned into a full-blown celebrity culture of millions. What remains the 
same both then and now, however, is the importance of seeking regard (or esteem, or 
glory) – if the best singer chooses to remain in his or her hut, how can he or she possibly 
become the most highly regarded?  Rousseau saw the public regard via esteem and glory 
as a road to advantage, observing that “as soon as men had begun mutually to value one 
another, and the idea of esteem was formed in their minds, each one claimed to have a 
right to it, and it was no longer possible for anyone to be lacking it with impunity.”38 That 
is, almost immediately as it is given, the competition to stockpile esteem and glory – and 
thus social advantage – amongst human beings begins.  
Moreover, for the celebrity (or public glory-seeker) both then and now, “It was 
necessary, for his advantage, to show himself to be something other than what he in fact 
was.”39 In other words, in order to maintain that publically given-glory, one had to 
continue to be the entertaining star the public wanted to see. That is, after the 
performance outside the hut, the singer would now be watched more carefully and by 
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more people, even when they weren’t singing. This is still true nowadays – as Kanye says 
in an interview with Steve McQueen, “Life is a performance.”40 That performance, 
driven by glory-seeking, does indeed reap socially advantageous rewards, but those 
rewards may also often come at the detriment of the glory-seeker. Rousseau, like Hobbes 
and Plato before him, observes that there is a “universal desire for reputation, honors, and 
preferences, which devours us all…making all men competitors, rivals, or rather 
enemies.”41 According to Rousseau, it is to this innate glory-seeking desire, “to this ardor 
for making oneself the topic of conversation, to this furor to distinguish oneself which 
nearly always keeps us outside ourselves, that we owe what is best and worst among 
men, our virtues and vices, our sciences and our errors, our conquerors and our 
philosophers, that is to say, a multitude of bad things against a small number of good 
ones.”42 That is, glory-seeking for social advantage or power can often cause more harm 
than good. This is still true in modern celebrity culture: As Kanye says in his song “Can’t 
Tell Me Nothing”: “I feel the pressure, under more scrutiny/And what I do? Act more 
stupidly.”43  
However, some are able to navigate the pitfalls of celebrity glory-seeking in a 
better way than others. Those who can do so certainly become famous for being famous 
by virtue of being “the best” at being a celebrity, which carries a social clout beyond any 
talent that already contributes to their fame. Kanye West is someone who takes advantage 
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of the glory-based social structures observed by Rousseau by injecting a powerful sense 
of ownership over the negativity that a public including “haters” direct his way. In doing 
so, he is able to not only accelerate the Hobbesian power-via-glory/glory-via-power cycle 
for himself, but also navigate Rousseauian concepts of power and reputation as well.  
For Rousseau, similarly to Hobbes, “the words power and reputation” [or glory] 
are deeply meaningful to the “type of men who place some value on the regard the rest of 
the world has for them, and who know how to be happy and content with themselves on 
the testimony of others rather than their own.”44 This living solely for the opinions of 
others, as mentioned before, can certainly be a destructive way to seek glory, but that is 
precisely where Kanye diverges from many celebrities and it is ultimately what makes 
him successful and socially advantaged as glory-seeker: though he seeks glory through 
others in his celebrity status, he does so with an authentic self-aware swagger (perhaps 
even in a Sartrean “good faith”) that keeps him afloat. Kanye West himself explains: 
I don’t have some type of romantic relationship with the public. I’m like, the anti-
celebrity, and my music comes from a place of being anti…[On the other hand,] 
it’s always going to be 80 percent, at least, what I want to give, and 20 percent 
fulfilling a perception. If you walk into an old man’s house, they’re not giving 
nothing. They’re at 100 percent exactly what they want to do. I would hear stories 
about Steve Jobs and feel like he was at 100 percent exactly what he wanted to 
do, but I’m sure even a Steve Jobs has compromised. Even a Rick Owens has 
compromised. You know, even a Kanye West has compromised….I think what 
Kanye West is going to mean is something similar to what Steve Jobs means. I am 
undoubtedly, you know, Steve of Internet, downtown, fashion, culture. Period. By 
a long jump. I honestly feel that because Steve has passed, you know, it’s like 
when Biggie passed and Jay-Z was allowed to become Jay-Z. I’ve been connected 
to the most culturally important albums of the past four years, the most influential 
artists of the past ten years…I will be the leader of a company that ends up being 
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worth billions of dollars, because I got the answers. I understand culture. I am the 
nucleus.45 
 
Kanye is nothing if not confident, but it’s the simultaneous earnestness and craftiness of 
his confidence that makes him the “best” glory-seeker in modern celebrity culture – the 
one most equipped to be famous for being famous. First and foremost, Kanye is realistic 
about fulfilling a perception and not being fully himself. Rousseau observed that the 
original hut-and-tree village celebrities even had to be something they weren’t in order to 
maintain the stream of glory they were enjoying – Kanye takes that notion and flips it 
into a powerful, realistic, and oddly relatable embrace of his status as an “anti-celebrity.” 
In doing so he allows his power to dictate his glory, not his glory to dictate his power, 
even while increasing both in a Hobbesian cycle. 
Additionally, Kanye strategically aligns himself with other successful names 
routinely in public comments, such as Steve Jobs, Rick Owens, and The Notorious B.I.G. 
He’s not even ashamed to do so – when asked if he name-drops in order to appear more 
powerful, he responded in the affirmative, declaring, “I want the power to create what is 
in my mind. That's my dream. I want to be able to have a thought or an idea and bring it 
into reality.”46 Again, this raw honesty and self-awareness is what allows Kanye to 
maintain his social advantage via glory-seeking. It is his vulnerable-yet-authentic-but-
certainly-bombastic method that brings him so many fans and so many “haters” – either 
way he is being talked about by everyone and is authentic in his pursuit to make this 
happen. According to our previous analysis on Jean-Paul Sartre, that would mean Kanye 
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seeks glory for social advantage in “good faith” – that is, he is grounded and realistic 
about responding to the expectations of a socially ungrounded and surrealistic celebrity 
culture – and that is precisely what makes him successful in gaining and maintain the 
sought-after Hobbesian social advantage fueled by his glory-seeking soul. And that 
intricate understanding of the art of glory-seeking within a society is what’s truly 
impressive about him – even as a talented musician, he is famous for being famous. 
Ultimately, what makes Kanye the preeminent current example of glory-seeking 
as social advantageous within modern celebrity culture is that he is a man who 
understands and utilizes both Hobbesian glory-power dynamics and Rousseauian glory-
based social structures: Hobbesian glory-power dynamics being two concepts dependent 
on a society of others existing in a continuously growing cycle and Rousseauian glory-
based social structures being the public-esteem-based celebrity culture that grows out of 
idleness and entertainment. In this way, in a celebrity culture, those who can seek glory 
the best (and thus attain it) are at a social advantage over others – this gives them power, 
which in turn adds to their glorified status as celebrities via fame. Thus, being famous for 
being famous can be understood as being the “best” at glory-seeking in a world of glory-
seekers – thus gaining social advantage. In modern times, one of the best at this trade is 
Kanye West – as Jon Caramancia of The New York Times observes: 
No rapper has embodied hip-hop’s often contradictory impulses of narcissism and 
social good quite as [Kanye], and no producer has celebrated the lush and the 
ornate quite as he has. He has spent most of his career in additive mode, figuring 
out how to make music that’s majestic and thought-provoking and grand-scaled. 
And he’s also widened the genre’s gates, whether for middle-class values or high-
fashion and high-art dreams. At the same time, he’s been a frequent lightning rod 
for controversy, a bombastic figure who can count rankling two presidents among 
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his achievements, along with being a reliably dyspeptic presence at award shows 
(when he attends them).47 
 
It’s all of this news and notoriety that keeps Kanye in the spotlight, but it’s his honest-
rebel-attitude and know-how of glory-seeking that gain and maintain his socially 
advantage. Through his incredible navigation of celebrity culture, putting both Hobbesian 
glory-power dynamics and Rousseauian glory-based social structures to work for his 
benefit, Kanye West has gained much social glory and a lot of celebrity power. Perhaps 
there is some truth what Kanye meant when he said – “I am the nucleus.” 
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59 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Glory-seeking as an Answer to Existential Angst II: Social Media 
In order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all necessary to 
procure a phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an all-embracing something which is nothing, 
a mirage – and that phantom is the public – Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age 
There are many existential works that provide insight into glory-seeking as a cure 
for existential angst and way in which to ultimately matter. Alongside Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
Being and Nothingness and Nausea, Søren Kierkegaard’s The Present Age also has 
something to offer with regards to the existential importance of glory-seeking. Upon 
observing current societies and the individuals who inhabit them, one can find numerous 
manifestations of glory-seeking and, with closer examination, evidence of its prevalence 
as well. This may or may not come as a surprise – after all, Kierkegaard and Sartre made 
their observations not so long ago.  
While many current examples can be found and analyzed regarding glory-
seeking, the one that primarily comes to mind for me in an existential sense is the 
panoptical presence of social media and how our glory-seeking souls navigate online 
communities. What – if anything – would Sartre and Kierkegaard have to say about this 
phenomenon?  
While I’m not quite sure exactly how or in what way these existential thinkers 
would respond, given the texts they’ve left behind, I would imagine that the idea of 
glory-seeking as a cure for existential angst would play a large role in the answer. In this 
way, through applying the thoughts on glory-seeking presented in The Present Age, Being 
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and Nothingness, and Nausea to glory-seeking phenomena in the modern world today, 
the notion of glory-seeking as an existentially inherent and advantageous part of the 
human condition becomes less of an abstract theory and more of an actualized reality. 
Cultural Crossover: Social Media, The Present Age, and Being & Nothingness  
Perhaps the largest contribution my generation (those born in the 1990’s who 
grew up alongside the internet) has to society is social media. Between Twitter, 
Instagram, YouTube and, of course, Facebook, the modern individual is nearly required 
to have an online persona of some sort these days – even my parents and grandparents are 
on Facebook! What is of interest to me, however, are all the odd needs, impulses, pitfalls, 
and feelings that social media causes for both those around me and myself: Why is it that 
when I go to a bar (or anywhere) with my friends that they take dozens of pictures to 
immediately upload to Facebook or Instagram? Or when something noteworthy happens 
in the news, why is it that seemingly everyone with internet access (myself included) 
feels the need put out a Facebook status or Twitter tweet offering their two-cents on New 
and Noteworthy Media Event X?  
I think the answer has to do with glory-seeking and, specifically, the existential 
glory-seeking that grows from this innate need that people seem to have: wanting to 
ultimately matter. Where better to chase that feeling than a limitless world of virtual 
peers who can serve as readily available judges of what one says and, by extension, how 
much one matters? However, as noted by the previous investigation on the writings of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, there are both good (authentic, good faith) and bad (inauthentic, bad 
faith) ways to glory-seek within an existential context. In a virtual world brimming with 
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“Others” who are “looking,” one must truly be careful not to become a prisoner to others 
– and to oneself – in the process of feeding his or her glory-seeking soul via the 
seemingly socially advantageous forum of social media. 
The Panopticon – a circular penitentiary containing a “tower with windows that 
could peer into every prisoner's cell”48 at the center – was a total-surveillance penal 
system proposed by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham near the end of the eighteenth-
century. Its name is derived from the Greek legend of Argus Panoptes, the goddess 
Hera’s one-hundred eyed watchman, who, as his name suggests, was “all-seeing.”49 
Twentieth-century French philosopher Michel Foucault further expanded on Bentham’s 
Panopticon, essentially theorizing that the mere “presumption of surveillance would make 
real surveillance unnecessary,” thus making each member of the Panopticon “a prisoner 
of his own watchfulness.”50  
In modern societies around the world, public surveillance is essentially 
inescapable – it is nearly impossible to walk into a building now without seeing a video 
camera. However, more intriguingly, surveillance is expanding further, pushing into 
once-private realms via the self-provided, carefully-crafted, and publically-personal 
pages of social media. Through the countless Tweets, Facebook pages, Instagram 
updates, and YouTube videos available online, people everywhere are now able to peer 
into the digitally-doctored lives of those around them. Knowing others will also be 
peering back at them through these channels of social media, individuals soon become 
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prisoners to their projected public personae, presenting themselves on these online 
forums in an inauthentic-yet-socially-appealing manner. Social media, in this regard, is 
very much a modern Panopticon in which all who participate are in danger of becoming 
prisoner to their own existential anxiety, submitting to the watchful eyes of others, in fear 
of their own freedom in the face of existential awareness, through inauthentic living both 
online and offline.  
Inauthentic-versus-authentic living (and by extension, inauthentic-versus-
authentic glory-seeking) with respect to the question of existential anxiety is a problem 
that greatly concerned thinkers such as Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and 
French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Consequently, their ideas are quite relevant to any 
inquiry into the panoptical role of social media in modern society. For Kierkegaard, 
social media can be understood as a digital manifestation of “the public,”51 a universal 
forum in which the normative ethics of society are communicated. For Sartre, social 
media is a sort of method in which humans beings can “escape all that they are”52 and 
participate in play-acting. The panoptical presence of social media thus makes it easier 
for humans to participate in inauthentic living (bad faith glory-seeking) – fearfully fleeing 
from existential anxiety rather than willfully facing and embracing the awareness of one’s 
own existence and freedom in the world, and thereby living authentically (good faith 
glory-seeking). 
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In a Kierkegaardian sense, social media is essentially a technological expression 
of “the public.”53 In his work, The Present Age (1846), Kierkegaard describes “the 
public” as “a gruesome abstraction by which the individual receives his religious 
characterization – or sinks.”54 That is, the public is “an all-embracing something which is 
nothing,”55 a faceless phantom informing each singular individual of the dogmatic norms 
expected of them by their universal society – what Kierkegaard derisively refers to as 
“the crowd” (which, for him, is the bearer of untruth).56 In “the age of advertisement and 
publicity,” for Kierkegaard, “nothing ever happens, but there is instantaneous publicity 
everywhere.”57  
This panoptical notion of “instantaneous publicity everywhere” effectively 
describes the current state of social media, as scholar Dhiraj Murthy explains regarding 
the social media site Twitter: 
Kierkegaard’s argument, however, is critically important to understanding Twitter. 
There is definitely an ‘immediate publicity everywhere’…in that everything from 
one’s daily happenings or musings become part of a publicity-driven culture. In a 
sense, Twitter markets us through our tweets and, as such, shifts us more towards ‘an 
age of advertisement,’ where we are not necessarily advertising products, but rather 
ourselves (and our self-commodification). As research has shown the amount of 
followers or friends one has on social media websites factors into how we perceive 
ourselves. And, following the inverse, cyber-bullying has the real potential to harm or 
even destroy one’s self-image.58 
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It is in this way that the panoptical omnipresence and public treatment of social media 
sites such as Twitter make inauthentic living easier, shifting society further into an “age 
of advertisement” where users themselves are commoditized in bad faith with self-
indulgent statistics like “number of followers.” In other words, through social media one 
can digitally “flee for refuge into the crowd, and so flee in cowardice from being an 
individual”59 – essentially dealing with the Nausea of existential awareness through bad 
faith glory-seeking, away from shame and towards a false-pride. Thus, in a 
Kierkegaardian sense, social media is ultimately a technological version of the 
inauthentic “public,” in effect serving as a medium through which people are able to 
fearfully flee in bad faith from any existential anxiety garnered by their individuality, 
rather than willfully face and embrace (in good faith) the awareness of their own 
existence and freedom in the world. Social media, in this regard, can contribute towards a 
failure of someone to exercise their ability to break apart from Kierkegaard’s “crowd” 
and, therefore, seek glory authentically in the virtual Panopticon as well as beyond it. 
Social media, from a Sartrean perspective, is a way in which humans beings can 
participate in play-acting and “escape all that they are.”60 In his work, Being and 
Nothingness (1943), Sartre establishes play-acting as a manifestation of bad faith where a 
human’s efforts and judgments “all aim at establishing that they are not what they are.”61 
Today, there is no better stage on which to play-act than the Panopticon of social media, 
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where one’s potential audience – virtual conduits of the glory-that-is-sought – is virtually 
limitless. With personally-provided, carefully-crafted, and digitally-doctored Facebook, 
Twitter, and Instagram social media pages, human beings may readily become anything 
they want online – they can “flee from themselves, escape themselves, leaving their 
tattered garments in the hand of the fault-finders.”62 That is, social media allows for 
human beings to escape the real and true aspects of themselves they dislike in favor of a 
more agreeable public façade – this is the crux of bad faith glory-seeking towards false-
pride. This impulse to play-act can also be understood in terms of dealing with Sartre’s 
notion of “the look” of “the Other”, a concept that scholar Michael Peters explains: 
‘The look’ is part of the examination by Sartre of avoiding deep Cartesian problems 
of solipsism that originate from a standpoint devoted entirely to the cogito, or the 
thinking subject. Sartre argues that we need the Other in order to realize our own 
being…Sartre’s account of the look and the Other as someone who must be 
encountered…defines an ontology defining consciousness as a negation aimed 
fundamentally at freedom formed through the choices we make…‘The look’ in 
Sartre’s philosophy brings into play an intersubjective world and, indeed, the realm of 
interpersonal relations.63 
 
It is in this context that social media takes on a panoptical distinctiveness – where 
“looks” are coming from every direction from a countless number of “Others.” Thus, the 
treatment of social media makes the human impulse towards inauthentic living, or bad 
faith glory-seeking, easier. Social media in this way acts, in a Sartrean sense, as a sort of 
twisted looking-glass through which one is able to facilitate what exactly about them will 
be looked-at by “the Others” who are always looking-on. This medium towards “bad 
faith” via play-acting keeps man away from authenticity, or being what he “really is” – as 
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(2010): Pg. 42-61. Academic OneFile. Web. 1 Nov. 2013. Pg. 45-46. 
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Sartre explains, “If man is what he is, bad faith is forever impossible and candor ceases to 
be his ideal and becomes instead his being.”64 In a Sartrean context, social media 
provides a grand and virtual stage on which human beings can play-act, allowing them to 
readily flee from the nauseous anxiety of existential awareness in bad faith. By “leaving 
their tattered garments in the hands” of the on-looking “Others”, human beings can 
effectively use social media to partake in inauthentic living – bad faith glory-seeking 
towards false-pride – through play-acting rather than willfully facing and embracing the 
awareness of their own existence and freedom in the world, “becoming instead their 
being”, and thus living – and seeking glory – authentically in good faith. 
 Ultimately, the Panopticon of social media is a virtual world that must be 
navigated carefully if one is to remain authentic while seeking glory. Modern social 
media is essentially inescapable – one cannot reasonably be expected to shun virtual 
connectivity completely and still somehow manage to function practically in a modern 
world that is increasingly dependent on these important, albeit inauthentic, connections. 
Therefore, what is most important in an existential sense is that, in the process of 
participating in social media, one never forgets the inauthentic dangers of the medium 
that one is using. As modern individuals navigate the virtual voyeurism of digitally-
doctored, carefully-crafted, and self-supplied Tweets, Facebook pages, Instagram 
updates, and YouTube videos available online, they must continuously choose to respond 
to their glory-seeking souls authentically (in good faith) rather than inauthentically (in 
bad faith). While modern individuals cannot readily escape the virtual Panopticon of 
                                                
64 Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Being & Nothingness.” Basic Writings of Existentialism. Ed. Gordon Marino. New 
York: Modern Library, 2004. 370-90. Print. Pg. 385. 
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social media – the preeminent modern forum for glory-seeking –  they must never forget 
that it is they themselves that constantly makes the choice to be a prisoner of their own 
watchfulness or not: either by seeking glory in bad faith and submitting to the perceived 
watchfulness of “the public” or “the crowd” or “the Other” in fear of the freedom to be 
oneself; or by willfully facing and embracing the perils of the Panopticon of social media 
in good faith, armed with authentic autonomy. Judging from their writings, Søren 
Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre would both agree – the choice between authentic living 
and inauthentic living in any social context is ultimately each individual’s and each 
individual’s alone to make. Thus, in the end, for every individual, there is only but one 
important question that remains regarding how to navigate his or her glory-seeking soul: 
Should I seek glory in good faith or bad faith? 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
Why Does Glory-seeking Matter? 
 Through this collective analysis on the thoughts and writings of Plato, Thomas 
Hobbes, Jean-Paul Sartre, Homer, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Søren Kierkegaard, and the 
modern examples of the NFL, Celebrity Culture, and Social Media, we can conclude that 
glory-seeking does indeed matter as an inherent, socially advantageous, and existentially 
important force to be reckoned with throughout the human experience.  
For Plato, glory-seeking is an inherent part of the human condition. It is an innate 
portion of the tri-partite soul (thumos) that must navigate itself alongside its siblings: 
appetite (eros) and reason (logos). Through both Homer’s Iliad and the be-a-player-not-a-
patient culture surrounding injuries in the National Football League today, glory-seeking 
(thumos) has been shown as an intrinsic desire that, if let run wild, can usurp both eros 
and logos in physically dangerous ways. 
 For Hobbes, glory-seeking is a socially advantageous tool to be used in the natural 
state of war mankind finds itself in. Drawing from the innateness of glory-seeking as 
established by Plato, further analysis on Hobbes provided a picture of a society in which 
all members are at least, in part, glory-seekers, meaning that both glory and power can be 
derived for those who seek glory the best – those can win the natural state of war that pits 
glory-seeker against glory-seeker. Extending this picture to modernity, alongside the 
esteem-based social-structures established by Rousseau in Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality, celebrity culture serves as a chief glory-seeking forum in the present-day 
where those who are the best at glory-seeking in a society of glory-seekers (such as 
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Kanye West) can become famous for being famous, achieving both power-through-glory 
and glory-through-power as long as they can maintain. 
 In a Sartrean sense, glory-seeking provides an answer to existential angst – either 
as a short-term, inauthentic cure to Nausea through bad faith glory-seeking, or a long-
term, authentic solution through good faith glory-seeking. Extending the analysis from 
Plato (innate) and Hobbes (socially advantageous), glory-seeking becomes existentially 
important through how one chooses to glory-seek – either in good or bad faith. In the 
present day, (and also The Present Age) both the writings of Kierkegaard and Sartre 
(Being and Nothingness) offer insight on how to navigate the modern virtual panopticon 
of glory-seekers: social media. 
 That is the basic (and hopefully well-established) theory at this point: glory-
seeking matters because it is an inherent, socially advantageous, and existentially 
important force within each and every human experience. Still though, some questions 
remain to be addressed with regards to this glory-seeking theory established from my 
analysis on Plato, Hobbes, Sartre, their contemporaries, and the chosen modern 
manifestations. Perhaps the largest, and somewhat all-encompassing question is this: 
given that glory-seeking exists as both an individual and social phenomenon, how should 
one live in awareness of it? In other words: How does glory-seeking matter to me and 
where am I supposed to go from here? 
 I think the best way to answer these remaining questions is to focus on 
recognition, appropriation, and authenticity – valued concepts that correspond 
respectively to the already established innateness, social advantage, and existential 
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importance of glory-seeking. Hopefully, these value-judgments of how each previously 
discussed component of glory-seeking should be approached will help shed light onto 
how glory-seeking as a whole should be navigated. 
 First and foremost, it is important to establish recognition of glory-seeking as an 
inherent part of the human soul. Perhaps the question of “Should I even bother seeking 
glory at all?” crossed your mind while reading this work, especially given the numerous 
individually and social destructive examples that stem from this innate glory-seeking 
desire. However, this is wrong question to ask and the analysis on Plato’s tripartite soul 
should tell you why – you’re doomed to glory-seek. It is hard-wired into the human 
condition. There is no escape. There is no choice not to, on some level, reconcile this 
innate impulse with how one lives. However, if there is one thing to take away from this 
work, it should be that glory-seeking (thumos) is a very real, impossibly inescapable, and 
possibly dangerous force within the soul if allowed to overpower its siblings eros and 
logos – take the overly appetitive and thumotic tyrant in The Republic as an example. 
Even for those who are ruled primarily by logos, thumos still plays a part in their daily 
decision-making and thus is an inescapable ingredient to the human condition. Given this 
Platonic framework, each and every human being will be forced to negotiate thumos and 
glory-seeking in various ways throughout their lives. As the modern example of injury 
culture in the NFL, as well as the analysis on glory-seeking in Homer’s Iliad showed, 
glory-seeking is something that can lead to one’s downfall if not properly controlled. 
Thus, it is imperative to recognize glory-seeking as an inherent part of the human soul 
and consequently examine its role in daily decision-making. This is not to say that 
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thumos and glory-seeking are bad – there are plenty of individually and socially positive 
uses of thumos such as being a solider-guardian within Plato’s Republic or taking some 
pride in one’s individual accomplishments and oneself. However, as the charioteer’s 
image in the Phaedrus demonstrates, thumos is at its best when directed by logos and 
running side-by-side with eros. The chariot, or human soul at-large, is at its best when all 
parts are working together in harmony – when the two strong horses of thumos and eros 
are recognized and guided thoughtfully by logos. It is in this regard that recognition of 
glory-seeking for what it is – an inherent and inescapable part of the human soul that each 
and every human must negotiate in some way – is the first and most crucial step in 
answering how glory-seeking matters for each individual as they move forward in life. 
After all, it is quite difficult to go anywhere with a broken chariot that had its horses run 
away. 
 Secondly and more expansively, it is important to appropriate glory-seeking for 
social advantage. Given the innateness established by Plato, further analysis from Hobbes 
painted a society in which all members are at least in part glory-seekers, pitting all-
against-all in a natural state of war for the prized and self-perpetuating ends of glory and 
power. Judicious appropriation becomes important in this framework because not all 
methods of glory-seeking for social advantage is ultimately a good thing for the soul 
itself. That is, the process of glory-seeking for socially advantageous glory and power can 
often lead to detrimental behavior towards oneself and others if not appropriated 
properly. Glory is the third principle of quarrel amongst men according to Hobbes’s 
Leviathan. While winning a quarrel is certainly better than losing one, not quarreling in 
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the first place is the optimal choice. Even if quarrel is inevitable (as a world of people 
who are at least in part glory-seekers would suggest) there are definitely more effective 
and less effective methods of glory-seeking for social advantage over others. For 
example, rather than the warlike violence of the Greek military or the NFL, modern 
celebrity culture offers a physically harmless outlet through which one can glory-seek to 
their own social advantage. Born out of idleness and the innate desire to seek glory, as 
observed by Rousseau in Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, celebrity culture provides 
an entertaining, safe, and public forum in which each driven glory-seeker can compete 
for both glory and power, and, consequently social advantage. In this way, through 
proper appropriation, glory-seeking can become less of a war and more of a game. 
Today, Kanye West is one of the best at this glory-seeking game – someone who is not 
only an incredibly talented musician, but someone who understands the cyclically 
growing power and social advantage that comes with attaining and, more importantly 
maintaining, fame for being famous. Thus, appropriation away from thumotic violence 
and towards glory-driven entertainment is a good social outlet for Hobbesian glory-
seeking. However, glory-seeking also needs to be appropriated internally as part of the 
search for authenticity. 
 Finally and ultimately, it is existentially important to seek glory authentically. 
Whether one is an NFL athlete, a Greek warrior, a Hobbesian natural man, a modern 
celebrity, a user of social media, or simply a human being, both the individually and 
socially optimal way for the soul to fulfill its thumotic drive for glory is to seek it 
authentically in good faith. As the analysis of Sartre indicates, like anything in life, glory-
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seeking itself is subject to choice – in this case a choice between inauthentic, bad faith 
glory-seeking and authentic, good faith glory-seeking. Bad faith glory-seeking, derived 
from the concepts of play-acting and the look of the Other presented in Being and 
Nothingness and Nausea, is a short-term solution to the omnipresent ontological Nausea 
of existential awareness – it is a fleeting way to feel fulfilled and feel as though one 
matters through an inauthentic false-pride wholly dependent on averting shame in the 
presence of Others. Good faith glory-seeking, on the other hand, is a long-term solution 
to existential angst – it is a sustentative method to deal with ontological Nausea and truly 
feel as though one matters, an authentic true-pride derived from the respect of Others but 
ultimately dependent on how one views oneself. That is, the motivation of why and how 
one acts within various social forums – such as the modern panopticon of social media 
derived in part from Kierkegaard’s The Present Age – is essentially what separates good 
faith glory-seeking from bad faith glory-seeking. The section on social media ended with 
the question: Should I seek glory in good faith or bad faith? I believe, as the concept of 
authenticity would suggest, that glory should be sought in good faith. Moreover, in the 
process of pursuing glory authentically and in good faith, one also upholds the values of 
appropriation of social advantage (Hobbes) and recognition of innateness (Plato). That is, 
authentic glory-seeking is both socially and existentially advantageous because it allows 
one to live authentically and consequently to appropriate any advantages gained from the 
innate, thumotic drive to seek glory. Authentic glory-seeking, thus, existentially matters 
and ultimately matters most because it allows for human beings to overcome the inherent 
and inescapable problem of human existence – the ontological Nausea of existential 
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awareness – and navigate that problem and, as a result, the other Platonic and Hobbesian 
aspects of glory-seeking in a positive way. 
 So: How does glory-seeking matter to me and where am I supposed to go from 
here? Ultimately, glory-seeking matters because it is inherent, socially advantageous, and 
existentially important for every single human being. Through an adherence to the 
corresponding respective values of recognition, appropriation, and, most importantly, 
authenticity, glory-seeking as a whole can be optimally navigated for each and every 
human being. That is where, I hope, one strives to go after reading this work: a 
recognition of glory-seeking’s innateness, a thoughtful appropriation of how to use it for 
social advantage, and an authentic choice to seek glory in good faith. Given our entire 
investigation on glory-seeking for Plato, Hobbes, Sartre, Homer, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, 
the NFL, celebrity culture, and social media, my final recommendation for how one 
should live in light of his or her inherent, socially advantageous, and existentially 
important glory-seeking soul is this: Authentic living marked by recognition of the 
composition of one’s soul and appropriation of how to satisfy it at both the individual and 
social levels. The choice to follow that recommendation, of course, is yours – the 
charioteer logos must never forget that he or she alone has the choice and the power to 
harness thumos and eros…or let them run wild and crash. 
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